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PREFACE 
 
This project work was taken due to the extremely important role of oil and gas sector 
in today‟s economy. At first we wanted to take on a comparative study of two separate 
gas projects – Snøhvit and Ormen-Lange. This was necessitated by the fact that 
Ormen-Lange was constructed without significant cost overrun and within schedule 
while Snøhvit was riddled with much cost and time overrun. We believed that finding 
out why Ormen-Lange was within budget would throw more light on what went wrong 
in Snøhvit but we were dissuaded by our external examiner who argued that both 
projects adopted different technologies and as such there is no solid base for such 
cost comparison. As a result, we scaled it down to this present scope where we 
conducted an in-depth analysis of causes of cost overrun in Snøhvit. Nevertheless 
chapter 8 of this work was more on Ormen-Lange, particularizing on its scope, 
technology and contacting method and comparing them to that adopted in Snøhvit. 
This was aimed at understanding how the logistics challenges faced during 
construction of Ormen-Lange were solved. 
Our believe was that such findings will help reduce the extent to which projects 
overran their budget especially in Nigeria – a country with numerous on-going oil and 
natural gas projects. 
 
Our thanks go to our supervisor Prof. Arild Hervik for providing the necessary data 
and link to those we interviewed and for guiding us through the project. We equally 
appreciate the efforts of Egil Gjesterland - the then acting chief executive of Statoil, 
and Henrik Carlsen - member of the investment committee (INVESTERINGSURVALGET) 
1998 set up by the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy to analyze the trend in 
investment on the Norwegian continental shelf, for assisting us with the project by 
agreeing to be interviewed. 
SUMMARY 
Snøhvit was a pioneer LNG project in which an entirely new engineering concept was 
adopted. It was an enormously gigantic project, with work having to take place all year 
round in quite a tight schedule. During its construction, the project was riddled with 
logistical challenges that resulted in budget and time overrun. The project exceeded 
its original cost estimate by more than 50%. Regular gas deliveries started on 1 
December 2007. This is eight months later than the originally estimated date of 1 June 
2007. Our task therefore, was to identify the logistic challenges that led to these 
overruns with the aim of limiting its effect in future LNG mega-project undertakings. 
 
Our analysis of the scope, technology, management, time schedules and cost 
estimations adopted during the construction of Snøhvit revealed, apart from others, 
three very important logistic shortcomings that eventually resulted in cost and time 
overrun. They are: 
1. IMMATURITY OF THE PROJECT WHEN IT’S PDO WAS APPROVED. The project was not 
sufficiently mature upfront when its PDO was approved. This resulted to changes in 
the scope and construction technique as the construction progresses. Changes were 
made to the original designs and the modules modified to be at par with these new 
designs. The outcome was extra costs and time that were not accounted for at the 
time the original cost and schedule estimates were made.  
2. CONTRACTUAL FLAWS. Conventionally, no contact is complete in itself and Snøhvit 
wasn‟t an exception. Due to the contract system adopted, there was the problem of 
asymmetric information between principal (Statoil) and agent (Linde). The 
consequence of that was an opportunistic behavior on the part of the agent, at least 
during the projects concept defining and selection stage. The agent presented an 
appealing engineering concept which unfortunately was not comprehensively 
researched on – a fact that was hidden from the client. As the project progressed, it 
became evident that they do not have an exhaustive control of the task and was quite 
incapable of handling such a gigantic, huge project. This resulted in faulty engineering 
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and re-workings which had to be corrected thus leading to delays and cost 
escalations. 
3. DELAYS IN SUPPLY OF MATERIALS ALONG THE SUPPLY CHAIN.  Snøhvit recorded, to 
a significant degree, uncertainty and disruption along its construction supply chain. 
These were in form of delays in supply of some strategic materials. The fact that 
Snøhvits supply chain was already complex and highly interdependent escalated the 
impact. The consequence was that a delay in one area led to delays and increased 
cost on other areas. It was hard to solve unforeseen problems in one phase without 
this having consequences for the next phase. Therefore, there costs which were not 
parts of the original budget. 
 
Key words: cost overrun, logistic challenges, cost estimates. 
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CHAPTER 3. INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH PURPOSE 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
According to Jackson (2002),”the construction industry has a reputation of delivering 
projects over budget, making national headlines for being financial disasters‖. He cited 
Barricks‟ (1995) survey of construction industry clients in the United Kingdom, which 
found that ―nearly one third (of clients) complained that their projects generally 
overran budget‖.  
 
In Norway, Olsson et all (2003) reported that analysis conducted by a Norwegian 
Parliamentary committee (Kaasen 1999) revealed a ―total budget overrun of 13% or 
3,470 million Euros for the total set of projects between 1994 and 1998‖.  
The Norwegian government report (NOU 1999:11) showed that even though the total 
amount spent on development and construction of projects along the country‟s 
continental shelf has gone down over the last ten years, the extent of reduction was 
not as much as expected. The report gave total cost overrun of 25 billion NOK for all 
projects that were approved by the government within 1994 to 1998.  
 
Normally, most construction projects comprise of two distinct phases; the pre-
construction and the construction stages.  Y. Frimpong, J. Oluwoye and L. Crawford 
(2003) noted that ―delay and cost overruns occur in both phases however, major 
causes of project overruns usually take place in the construction phase‖. 
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Figure 1. THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE IS CHARACTERIZED BY HIGH AMENDMENT COST. 
 
 
                                                                       Source:  Olsson et all (2003) 
 
The oil and gas sector are also not immune to this phenomenon. Almost all such 
projects - starting from their conceptual and developmental stages to construction and 
commissioning stages - are always huge technological, engineering and construction 
undertakings anywhere in the world. Flyvberg (2007) listed the characteristics of 
mega-projects to include: 
* They are inherently risky due to long planning horizons and complex interfaces 
between the project and its context, and between different parts of the project. 
* Decision making, policy, and planning are often multi-actor processes with 
conflicting interests. 
* Often the project scope or ambition level change significantly over time. 
* Statistical evidence shows that such unplanned events are often unaccounted for, 
leaving budget and other contingencies sorely inadequate. 
* As a consequence, misinformation about costs, benefits, and risks is the norm. 
* The result is cost overruns and/or benefit shortfalls with a majority of projects.‖ 
Certainly, there is no shortage of examples of oil and gas projects with cost overrun. A 
typical example is Shell‟s Sakhalin II project. It is a huge and complex oil and gas 
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production project at Sakhalin Island, off the east coast of Siberia in Russia. 
Construction of the project was approved in 2003 at an estimated cost of $10 billion. 
This figure is bigger than Shell‟s net income for the prior year but after two years of 
construction work, Shell announced that the cost had doubled to $20 billion. 
 
Figure 2: INCREASE OF UPSTREAM OIL & GAS CAPITAL COSTS OVER TIME 
 
 
 
In Nigeria, the Gas–to-liquid Escravos plant, which will convert natural gas into liquid 
petroleum products, has seen its initial cost estimate reviewed to $5.9 billion. This 
amount is more than three times its originally estimated cost. The project is designed 
to produce 34,000 barrels of fuel per day using flared gas. According to Senate report 
the project was signed in 1998 at a cost of $1.294 billion. This was increased to 
$2.721 billion in 2001 and is currently fixed at $5.9 billion. But the Oryx GTL in Qatar, 
which has the same volume and specification, began construction in 2003 and was 
commissioned and put to use in 2006 at the cost $900 million, ahead of Nigeria's plant 
whose contract was signed 1998. The Senate report states that, ‖the Nigeria's GTL 
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plant at Escravos which was due to be commissioned in 2009, has faced repeated 
upward review of job cost and that completion time is now fixed at December 2010‖. 
Nonetheless, there are reported and documented cases of oil and gas mega-projects 
that have been completed within cost and time. A report in the Economist by Mary 
Evans (2005) stated that, ‖the Saudi-Aramco Harady gas pipelines with original 
budget of $2 billion and three years was completed within six months ahead of 
schedule and 27% under budget‖. 
Also here in Norway is the Ormen-Lange Liquefied Gas project. The field was 
discovered in 1997 off the coast of North West of Kristiansund at a depth of about 850 
to 1100 meters below sea level. Just like Snøhvit, the Ormen-Lange was drilled in an 
area with extreme weather conditions and sub-zero water temperatures at seabed. 
The gas processing plant is also located onshore at Myanma and processed gas 
exported via pipeline to Easington-UK, 1200km away.  
The construction period was riddled with many challenges including steep and uneven 
seabed, harsh weather, subzero temperatures and many other issues but these did 
not prevent the teams from completing the project within the agreed budget and on 
time of 66billion NOK and 3 years ( 2004 – 2007) respectively. 
 
3.2 RESEARCH PURPOSE 
 
So many efforts has been made within the Norwegian oil and gas sector at reducing 
cost and time of projects within the sector. Early 1990, a task force named NORSK 
was formed solely to tackle this problem. They carried out a number of organizational 
and contractual changes with particular attention paid at reducing the construction 
lead time. Such changes saw the emergence, within Norway, of entities capable of 
handling complete projects from concept development, installations and start-up.  
They also revised the way risks were shared by stakeholders. Initially, risk were borne 
by oil companies but now, an even split of cost overruns and savings between the oil 
companies and contractors, relative to a target amount was introduced. 
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Regardless of all the efforts, figures obtained from the government study of 1999 for 
oil and gas projects carried out after the plan implementation in 1994 show an 
average of about 13.8 percent increase from what it was originally budgeted. The 
table below shows the analysis of budget overruns on some projects they conducted. 
 
Table 1. ANALYSIS OF BUDGET OVERRUNS IN SOME OIL/GAS PROJECTS 
 
       PROJECT BUDGET ESTIMATE (MILLION NOK) PRESENT COST (MILLION NOK) 
Yme 
                4572                  6940 
Valhall videreutv 
             23.225               35.051 
Volund 
                2982                  3865 
Vilje 
                2216                  2743 
Vega 
                6363                  7718 
Rev 
                2852                  3224 
Yttergryta 
                1302                  1461 
Skarv 
             33.643               37.490 
Alve 
                2583                  2865 
Gjøa 
             29.635               32.854 
                                                                           Source: Norwegian Oil and Energy Department (2009) 
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Figure 3. INCREASE IN PROJECTS WITH COST OVERRUN 
 
 
                                                                               Source: Norwegian Oil and Energy Department (2009) 
 
Analysis of the figures indicates that the entire projects under consideration has cost 
overrun of between 10.9 and 51.8 percent. This (in real figures) is a huge amount as 
most of these projects run into hundreds of billions of dollars.  
 
These unbudgeted amounts pose serious financial risks to the stake holders; 
therefore there is the need to identify the “logistic challenges, reasons and 
decisions” that contribute to these increases. Unfortunately, the extents of these 
challenges, which undoubtedly led to time and cost overruns, have remained under-
studied. Therefore the objective of our project is to find out what logistic 
challenges face a typical mega project in order to throw more light on why 
projects overrun using Snøhvit project as a case study. This will serve as platform 
at limiting the extent to which future undertakings are affected by cost and schedule 
overruns.  
3.3 SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
In an attempt to understand the logistic challenges involved in constructing and 
operating facilities in mega projects, our research was carried out as an analytical 
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case study of a mega gas project constructed here in Norway. It was a mega-project 
constructed with many delays and associated high cost over-runs.  
 
The Statoil Snøhvit project operates within the oil/gas industry and was designed and 
constructed from scratch. Feasibility studies, financial and contractual implications for 
the project were carried out by seasoned professionals but at the end of the first 
construction phase, Snøhvit was late with considerable budget over-runs. According 
to, Krauss et all (2005), “overruns have put the price of Snøhvit at $8.8 billion, almost 
50 percent above its original estimate‖. 
 
The study was based on documented project cost data obtained during the 
construction of the project‟s first phase. By carrying out a research in form a study of 
the projects operational pattern, sequence and time period allocated during 
construction, this paper will aim to identify and examine the logistics challenges and 
decisions (if any) that resulted in delays and cost overruns in Snøhvit LNG project 
despite its huge financial and professional abilities. 
 
3.4 DATA SOURCES 
 
Relevance and importance of any research project depends on quality and reliability 
of information and data used. In this regards we made use of published data from 
these reliable sources:  
(i) The Norwegian petroleum and energy department. 
(ii) The Norwegian Oil and Energy department. 
(iii) Annual reports of Statoil (2001 to 2008) and other publications from Statoil News 
journal. 
(iv) Report of the Investment committee (INVESTERINGSURVALGET 1999) set up by the 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy to analyze the trend in investments on the 
Norwegian continental shelf. 
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(v) Interview with Egil Reinhard Gjesterland, the then acting chief executive of Statoil. 
(vi) PhD thesis report by Trond Nilsen titled “Regional Interest in Snøhvit and Ormen-
Lange projects” of University of Tromso. (2008) 
 
We equally gathered primary information through interviews of other individuals some 
of whom were part of the decision makers during the construction period of Snøhvit 
while others are panel members in various oil and gas review committees. Questions 
used in the interviews were not really structured in nature but all were directed 
towards challenges faced during Snøhvits‟ construction. Therefore not exactly the 
same questions were asked every one interviewed.  
We also gathered quite a large number of information from validated scientific 
journals/publications relating to oil and gas sector. 
 
3.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Our work was mainly qualitative and required careful analysis of so many published 
works and literatures as regards the Snøhvit LNG project. The data sources are listed 
in section 3.5. Issues and topics related to cost and time overrun in Snøhvit were 
carefully sieved out from these literatures and publications and detailed analyses 
conducted in order to identify what logistic and other problems they  faced that could 
have resulted in the cost and time overrun recorded. 
 
We also consulted and interviewed some persons some of whom were part of the 
management of Snøhvit project during its construction period. Some others were 
economists and others part of the committee set up by the government to identify 
problems and its causes as regards construction projects within the Norwegian oil and 
gas sector. The interviews were somehow personal and as such were not structured 
in nature, This means that not exactly the same questions were asked every person 
but all question were directed towards identifying what could have led to the cost and 
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time escalation in Snøhvit.  At the end, our findings were pooled together and 
analyzed and results obtained. 
 
 
Figure 4:  TYPICAL LIFE CYCLE OF A CONSTRUCTED PROJECT. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                             © C. Hendrikson 1998 
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Analysis of the above figure shows that a completed project is made up of so many 
interdependent phases. Each of the phases contain hundreds of sub-phases. Delays 
and cost overruns occur in all these phases however, major causes of project 
overruns usually take place in the construction phase but the mistakes that led to 
these overrun were actually done during the planning and design stages. This paper 
attempted to locate the challenges faced during the approved time limit of Snøhvit 
regardless of phase‟s demarcations. 
 
3.6 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
 
A limitation of the research is that we studied only one case of a completed oil and 
gas mega-project riddled with cost and time overrun. This project (Snøhvit) was 
constructed in Norway – a developed, rich and highly civilized country.  As such, 
findings from just Snøhvit might not be used as a trusted yard stick for measuring 
challenges or why costs overrun in other developed but poor countries nor in less 
developed parts of the world. This is because of the existence of different challenges 
and situations within countries. All the same, it is our belief that our findings will 
undoubtedly throw more light as to why there are cost overruns in oil and gas mega-
projects.  
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CHAPTER 4. THE SNØHVIT LNG PROJECT 
4.1 AREA HISTORY 
 
The Snøhvit LNG Development Project, operated by Statoil, represents a pioneer 
project in the history of LNG. It is the first LNG full-scale liquefaction facility ever built 
in Europe and is located in one of the most fragile marine areas in the world. 
 
Figure 5: GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF HAMMERFEST 
 
                           
                                                                                          © Tractebel Gas Engineering 
 
The gas reserves in the Barents Sea off the coast of Northern Norway were 
discovered in the early 1980s. The Snøhvit area is located at the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf at 71o North in the Tromsøflaket West province of the Barents Sea. 
Snøhvit - the worlds' northernmost Liquefied Natural Gas plant – is a project 
comprising of production of gas and condensate from three fields in the Snøhvit-area 
namely Snøhvit, Albatross and Askeladd. The distance from the fields to shore is 
about 140 -160 kilometers and in 300 to 350 meters water depth. The total reserves 
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are in excess of 300 billion standard cubic meters of gas and 20 million cubic meters 
of condensate. (Heiersted and Lillesund 2004) 
4.2 PROJECT DEVELOPMENT. 
 
The first oil and gas exploration activity in the Norwegian continental shelf of the 
Barents Sea began back in 1980, with quite a substantial amount of gas-condensate 
discoveries made in the central part of the sea in the Snøhvit area. The major gas 
reserves were found contained in Middle-Lower Jurassic sandstone structures in 300-
340 m depth of water.  
Oil, on the other hand, was not found in large commercial quantities though Snøhvit 
field has about 500 million bbl of oil within a thin zone at the base of the reservoir. An 
attempt at drilling the oil was frustrated by rapid breakthrough of gas and water during 
the production test thus recovery was deemed noncommercial.  
In1994, drilling was completely stopped because of technology limitations prompting 
the Norwegian government in 1996 to revise existing licensing laws to encourage 
continued exploration activities. They cancelled drilling commitments for some 
awards, enabled group license applications, increased the equity shares and 
expanded oil blocks.  
In September 2001, the formal plan for development and operation was submitted by 
Statoil to the Norwegian Parliament. It was approved in March 2002. The plan showed 
that the whole process will be constructed in phases. It contained a field development 
made up a subsea production system with the well stream transported to the onshore 
processing plant in a multiphase transportation pipeline.  
4.3 GAS FIELDS 
 
The location of the processing plant is on the Island of Melkøya near Hammerfest. 
According to Norwegian Oil and Energy Department, the fields consist of the following 
licenses:  
* PL097, PL099 and PL110, which accounts for Snøhvit. 
 23 
* PL064 and PL077, which accounts for Askeladd field. 
* PL078, part of PL097 and PL100, which accounts for Albatross field. 
 
 
Figure 6: LOCATION OF SNØHVIT GAS FIELDS IN RELATION TO THE PLANT SITE 
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Interests of licensees in the Snøhvit project are indicated in the Table below. 
Table 2: LICENSES AND ALLOCATION OF INTERESTS 
 
                                                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   Source:    Norwegian oil and energy department 
            COMPANY    OWNERSHIP INTERESTS 
 Statoil ASA (operator)              22.29% 
 Petro AS               30.00% 
 Total Norge AS              18.40% 
 Gaz de France Norge AS              12.00% 
 Norsk Hydro Producksjon AS               10.00% 
 Amerada Hess Norge AS                3.26% 
 RWE-DEA Norge AS                2.81% 
Svenska Pet. Exploration AS                1.24% 
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The fields are scheduled for development in different phases which are shown in the 
table below. 
 
Table 3: TIME ESTIMATIONS FOR COMPLETION OF THE PHASES 
 
 
                                                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                              Source: The Norwegian oil and energy department                                                                                                                     
 
4.4 CONTRACTORS AND TECHNOLOGY 
 
In 1997, three contractors Kellogg, Bechtel and Linde were requested by Statoil to 
carry out conceptual designs for the Snøhvit LNG plant located at Melkøya Island 
near Hammerfest.   
 
The conceptual designs submitted showed that Kellogg adopted the APCI propane 
pre-cooled process, C3/MCR Liquefaction Process, in their design (Heiersted and 
Lillesund 2004). According to them, the process is ―the far most utilized process for 
base load liquefied natural gas plants, and has been utilized in virtually all base load 
liquefied natural gas plants installed (in) the last 20 years, with some few exceptions‖.  
 
 
 
 
PHASES       ACTIVITY PRODUCTION SCHEDULE 
     1 The Snøhvit field, pipeline to land and 
plant facilities at Melkøya. 
            2005 
     2       Askelaad             2011 
     3       Albatross             2018 
     4       Compression platform             2021 
       End of plateau period             2032 
       Field life             2035 
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Figure 7: THE PLANT SITE IN MELKØYA NEAR HAMMERFEST. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                 © Linde Technology 
 
They also noted that Bechtel applied the “Optimized Cascade Liquefaction Process” 
which is based on Phillips technology while Linde based their conceptual design on a 
―dual flow liquefaction process but proposed to change their design in eventual  
 
Figure 8: A SIMULATED DRAWING OF THE PLANT AND THE FIELDS 
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further stages of the project to a newly developed, proprietary Mixed Fluid Cascade 
Process, the MFC process‖. (ibid). 
 
At the end of the three conceptual designs evaluations, Statoil decided to award what 
it called an “Extended Conceptual Engineering contract to Kellogg and Linde”. The 
technology suggested by the third contractor, Bechel was not accepted but directed 
for further studies, due to the fact that ―its overall energy efficiency was too low 
compared to the MFC process and the C3/MCR process, which virtually have the 
same efficiency.‖(ibid) 
 
FIGURE 9    : FLOW CHART OF THE LOAD-BALANCED MFC®S3 PROCESS. 
 
                                                                                                                       © Statoil 
 
4.5 MAGNITUDE AND COMPOSITION OF THE PROJECT 
 
Snøhvit is an extremely complex installation. The process is extensive, encompassing 
subsea control processing, complex LNG processes, storage and loading of the final 
products. 
The whole operation is made up of the followings: 
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4.5.1 PIPELINES: These will act as the transportation system of all liquid streams to 
and from the offshore field structures. The pipelines are designed to go in closed 
loops thus ensuring a zero discharge situation during normal operations. 
The pipelines are further divided into three: 
 i) The main pipeline which will carry unprocessed well stream from the fields to the 
gas plant on Melkøya Island. This is about 143 km and 29 inches in diameter. The 
pipe is made of steel with an outer coating of reinforced concrete. Each pipe section 
weighs between eight and 10 tonnes, with a total of 11,000 sections making up the 
main line. The actual pipe laying operation began from Melkøya on 18 April 2005, with 
12-metre lengths of line pipe welded together in a continuous process on the lay 
barge and the task was completed June 4 2005 in what is to become the longest 
multiphase-flow pipeline in the world. 
ii) The umbilical‟s – this took shape in the form of a NOK 550 million contract awarded 
to Technip Offshore Norge and involved laying and connecting flow lines and 
umbilical‟s on the Barents Sea field, as well as the umbilical and chemical lines 
between Snøhvit and Melkøya. 
iii) The carbon dioxide pipeline. This is to transport recycled CO2 separated from the 
crude gas back into a separate formation on the Barents Sea field. It is a 9 inch 
pipeline with a 5 inch chemical line (mono-ethylene) laid onto the seabed in a method 
which provides a laying speed of 10-20 kilometers per day. According to Jorunn 
Klovning, manager of health, safety and the environment for the Tromsø 
Patch/Snøhvit, ―this will become the first offshore injection of carbon dioxide from a 
land-based plant,‖  
4.5.2 SUBSEA OPERATIONS OF THE PRODUCTION: The offshore fields were 
developed with subsea templates and the production managed from the onshore 
operation center at Melkøya. The subsea templates are four in number, each with four 
well slots. In addition is a control distribution system, which allocates power, control 
signals and chemicals, and a pipeline end manifold. (Statoil June 2004) 
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The pipeline end manifold will provide the connection point between flow lines from 
the templates and the main pipeline to the land-based plant at Melkøya outside 
Hammerfest.  All the offshore systems are located on the sea bed and controlled from 
land via a 143 – kilometer pipeline. Drilling of the production wells will be performed 
using a semi-submersible rig. 
 
4.5.3 ONSHORE LNG PLANT: This is a 33,000-tonne unit processing plant which 
forms the heart of the entire project. It consists of a barge-mounted production plant 
shipped to Norway from the fabrication yard in Cadiz, southern Spain.  
The process plant was constructed as one integrated unit on top of a barge with a 
deck size of 154 by 54 meters – considerably larger than an international football pitch 
(Statoil 2007). It was assembled at the Dragados Offshore yard in Cádiz - Spain, 
before being sailed to Hammerfest in a voyage estimation period of just under 11 
days. 
 
Figure 10:  THE SNØHVIT LNG PLANT ON THE BARGE “BLUE MARLIN”. 
 
                                                                                                                               © statoil 
 
According to Heiersted and Lillesund, ―The LNG plant construction strategy is based 
on maximum prefabrication. The basic concept is to install a base load LNG process 
train and most of its utilities on a purpose built barge and ship it to site. Compared to 
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other LNG plant executions, the Snøhvit project has changed the philosophy from on-
site, stick-built solutions to yard prefabrication, placing focus on maximum work 
executed in fabrication yards.‖ 
4.5.4 SHIPMENT OF PRODUCTS.  
The Snøhvit LNG carriers are specifically built for operation in the toughest LNG trade 
so far and are the highest specified gas carriers in the world. 
 
Figure 11: THE ARTIC PRINCESS: LNG CARRIER FOR SNØHVIT 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                © Statoil 
Figure 12: SITE ARRANGEMENT OF SNØHVIT GAS PROCESSING PLANT. 
 
 
                                                                                                    © Tractebel Gas Engineering 
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4.6 THE LNG PROCESSING PLANT 
 
The actual Project Plan was delivered to Norwegian authorities in September 2001 
and since the project was controlled by the Norwegian government, (in part through its 
majority ownership of the energy company Statoil), it is imperative that Snøhvit should 
be a success.  
The process to make liquefied natural gas requires energy. The LNG plant is a large 
refrigeration system, with three different cooling circuits, each powered by a 
compressor. Total power consumption for the three cold compressors is 152 MW. The 
compressors are powered by electric motors. In addition, the process has a heating 
requirement of 116 MW. Heating demand is covered from the gas heat. The power 
demand is covered by the 4 gas turbines (5 in a later phase of project). Gas turbines 
are connected to generators which supply power to the electrically driven 
compressors. 
Apart from Liquefied Natural Gas and condensates, the Snøhvit project is also 
expected to produce wet gases (LPG) which is separated out during the cooling of 
natural gas. LPG is a product which is also stored in liquid form at atmospheric 
pressure before shipment. Products are shipped to the markets using specifically 
constructed ships.  
 
4.7 ASSEMBLY PUZZLE:  
 
The various components of the liquefaction plant were not manufactured in a single 
workshop but had to be outsourced to different location and countries. These 
components were pre-assembled at eight major sites in Europe before final assembly 
and installation in Cadiz, Spain. Linde technology (2006) listed the locations and 
details of jobs done as shown below: 
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A. MELKØYA, NORWAY: Blasting, site preparation, excavation of process barge dock, 
construction of tanks, coolant tunnel, operations building and underwater access 
tunnel. 
B. BREMEN, GERMANY: Fabrication of cold box modules 
C. ANTWERP, BELGIUM: Final assembly and shipping of cold box. 
D. ZWIJNDRECHT, NETHERLANDS: Fabrication of slug catcher. 
E. HOBOKEN, BELGIUM: Fabrication of miscellaneous components and pipe bridges. 
F. SCHALCHEN, GERMANY: Fabrication of cryogenic heat exchangers. 
G. MASSA AND FLORENCE, ITALY: Fabrication of gas turbines and compressors. 
H. FERROL, SPAIN: Assembly of barge (steel hull). 
I. CÁDIZ, SPAIN: Installation of process plant on barge 
 
Figure 13: THE PREFABRICATED PROCESS WHICH WAS SHIPPED FROM A YARD IN SPAIN 
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4.8 OPERATIONAL MECHANISM 
 
Snøhvits‟ uniqueness is in its combination of offshore production, (a distinct operation 
from shore), with an onshore processing using up-to-date technology. It also makes 
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use of recycled gas for its operations. It is a method where CO2, separated from the 
produced gas onshore, are sent back offshore via pipeline for re-injection to a suitable 
reservoir. According to Engsbretsen et all, (2002), this is ―the first offshore 
development ever where CO2 is separated onshore and re-injected‖.  
The actual operation of the plant started at the end of 2007. It involves the sucking of 
gas stream through a 143km-long, 28 inch-wide steel pipe from the Snøhvit gas field 
out in the Barents Sea. It will then be cooled to -163 degrees Celsius before loading 
into specially constructed fleet of four tankers expectedly to sail 70 times a year to the 
US, France and Spain. 
 According to the EU Observer (June 26 2006), the capacity of these tankers are such 
that on each trip, ―each tanker will carry enough gas to power a city the size of 
Amsterdam for six months‖. 
 
 
Figure 14:  FLOW CHART OF SNØHVIT LNG PLANT 
 
                                                                                                                         © Dahl 2007 
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4.9 OTHER INSTALLATIONS ON MELKØYA ISLAND 
 
Besides the processing plant and the pipelines, there were other installations in 
Melkøya upon whose success are equally vital to the success of the entire project. 
The science and technology report (2003) listed these other installations as:  
 Pig receiver and slug catcher. 
 Tank farm with 2 LNG tanks, 1 LPG tank and a condensate tank. 
 Metering stations for the LPG and condensate. 
 Transfer station for LNG, LPG and condensate. 
 Construction jetty for site supply. 
 Construction jetty for construction activities. 
 Utility service station for offshore/subsea production. 
 Ethane and propane refrigerant drum. 
 Hot oil drain drum. 
 MEG (methyethylene glycol) tanks. 
 Fresh and de-mineralized water tanks. 
 High and low pressure flares with separators. 
 Cooling water intake and pump-pit, sump, outlet and weigh box (or equivalent 
pipe design). 
 Fire extinguishing water system. 
 Effluent treatment plant. 
 Electrical power network, sub-stations for tank storage and harbor. 
 Buildings for the central control room, offices, canteen, first aid, bathroom, 
maintenance facilities, warehouse, fire station, garage parking lots, guard 
houses/check point at tunnel entrance as well as on island (including fence 
between two areas), harbor offices, chemical storage, storage for gas bottles, 
laboratory, harbor facilities for tug and mooring boats. 
 Permanent camp. 
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 Temporary camp. 
 Subsea tunnel, roads, helicopter landing area. 
 Rock protection walls. 
 Service harbor. 
 
FIGURE 15:   3-DIMENSIONAL MODEL OF THE LNG STORAGE TANKS 
               
                                                                                                        ©Tractebel Gas Engineering        
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CHAPTER 5 THEORITICAL REVIEWS 
 
To fully understand the underlying logistics implications inherent in projects with cost 
overruns, we tried to analyze cost overruns from the perspective of those logistics and 
supply chain theories that are related to it. These theories abound in most supply 
chain and logistics literatures and publications and some are analyzed below: 
 
5.1 COST ESTIMATION AND ITS EFFECT ON COST OVERRUN 
 
According to Business dictionary (2010), cost estimation is defined as the 
―approximation of the probable total cost of a product, program, or project, computed 
on the basis of available information‖. It is seen here that the objective of cost 
estimate is its function as the yard stick upon which the cost of the project at different 
stages of development is measured. Almost all cost estimation technique use either 
one or more of the approaches below. They are fully explained in the book, “Project 
Management for Construction” by Chris Hendrickson (1998).  
 
5.1.1 Production function: Hendrickson (1998) describes the production function 
as ―relationship between the output of a process and the necessary resources (input).‖ 
He also stated that production function can be expressed in construction terms by the 
relationship between the volume of construction and a factor of production such as 
labor or capital. This function shows the relationship between the amount (and 
volume) of output to the different inputs of labor, material and equipment.  
Mathematically, the size of the output (Q) is a function of the different input factors of 
X1, X2, ……......, Xn. Thus, at any output level, it is possible to find the corresponding 
set input values in order to minimize the production cost.  
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5.1.2 Empirical cost inference:  Empirical estimation of cost functions makes use 
of statistical applications by relating the cost of a project to some important 
characteristics of the system (Hendrickson 1998). This approach employs regression 
analysis to estimates the best parameter values (constants) in an assumed cost 
function.  
 
5.1.3 Unit costs method of estimation: In this cost estimation approach, the 
entire project is decomposed into elements at various levels of details. There after 
quantities representing these tasks are assessed and a unit cost assigned to each of 
these tasks. The total cost is represented by summation of the costs incurred in each 
task. This concept of estimation apply to both design estimates and bid estimates, 
although varying elements may be selected in the decomposition.  
Consider a situation where a project is decomposed into n number of elements. Qi is 
the quantity of the ith element and ui be the corresponding unit cost. Then the projects 
total cost is expressed mathematically as 
 
                                            
     
By adjusting either one or all of the characteristics of the construction site, type of 
technology adopted, or even changing the management of the construction process, 
the estimated unit cost, ui for each element may be adjusted.  
 
5.1.4 Allocation of joint costs: Allocation of joint costs approach requires the 
development of a cost function through assigning each expenditure item to specific 
characteristics of the project. According to Hendrikson (1998), ―the allocation of joint 
costs should be causally related to the category of basic costs in an allocation 
process‖. 
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An example of allocation of joint costs in construction projects, is classifying the 
accounts for basic costs in terms of (i) labor, (ii) material, (iii) construction equipment, 
(iv) construction supervision, and (v) general office overhead.  
These basic costs are then allocated accordingly and proportionally to various tasks 
which are subdivisions of a project.  
 
Summarily, all the above cost estimation approaches unfortunately, are only error 
proof in ideal situations. In reality, errors occur when costs of projects are estimated or 
when the capital expenditure costs are reported. These errors are due to the fact that 
a significant portion of the cost estimates are based on “forecasts”. A projects total 
capital expenditure is therefore obtained from this error-prone estimated cost and this 
amount can be significantly inaccurate depending on the cost estimation technique 
adopted. An example below, (though in transportation sector) analyses the extent of 
inaccurate cost estimation on cost overruns. 
 
TABLE 4. INACCURACY OF TRANSPORTATION PROJECT COST ESTIMATES BY TYPE OF 
PROJECT (FIXED PRICES). 
 
Project type No of 
cases  
Average cost 
escalation (%) 
Standard 
deviation 
Level of 
significance 
Rail    58         44.7   38.4   <0.001 
Fixed-link    33         33.8   62.4   <0.004 
Road  167         20.4   29.9   <0.001 
All projects  258         27.6   38.7   <0.001 
                                                                                                                       Source: Bent Flyvbjerg et al (2002) 
 
 
General analysis of the above table shows that there exists inaccurate cost estimation 
of 31.6 % (on average), in all transport projects. Flyvbjerg et al (2002) went on to 
explain that, ―the phenomena of cost underestimation and escalation appear to be 
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characteristic not only of transportation projects but of other types of infrastructure 
projects as well‖. They suggested that the incorrect cost estimation results from, 
―forecasting errors‖ in technical terms, such as imperfect techniques, inadequate data, 
honest mistakes, inherent problems in predicting the future, lack of experience on the 
part of forecasters‖  
 
The Norwegian Government report (NOU 1999:11) also showed that there was ―a 
cost overrun of 25Billion NOK (3Billion USD) for projects within 1994 to 1998‖. This 
reported amount were attributed to “incorrect cost estimation” due to the large 
uncertainty in the construction industry and also due to the fact that most of the 
projects were being done for the very first time and as such does not give room for 
much learning process. 
 
5.2. CONTRACTING AND ITS EFFECT ON COST OVERRUN 
 
Construction industry, especially oil and gas projects, is made up of complex network 
of participants - employers, professionals, contractors and subcontractors. According 
to van Deventer and Lloyd, (1993), these participants are, ―all involved in highly 
technical processes, often with considerable financial investments at stake‖.  
 
In construction terms, contracts is defined by business dictionary (2010) as, ―a written 
agreement between the owner of a project (client) and a firm of professionals (called 
construction manager) for planning, design, construction, and commissioning of a 
construction project.‖ Depending on the type of project and contract type that best 
suits the project, contracts can be divided into: 
5.2.1 Fixed-Price Contract 
A fixed price contract is described by Wiley (2004) as when ―the price paid by the 
customer for the project is agreed and fixed at the out-set. When the product or 
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service is delivered then the customer pays this agreed price‖. This type of contract 
has two variables: 
i) The Fixed-Price with Economic Price Adjustment: This variation of fixed price contract 
according to Wiley (2004), ensures the protection of the customer and the contractor 
from unforeseen economic fluctuations in material and labour costs  
ii) The Fixed-Price Redetermination: This type of fixed-price contract ensures the shifting 
of unpredictable risks from the contractor to the client after the initial price has been 
negotiated. This is normally used when there is difficulty in cost estimation as a result 
of incomplete or unsure product requirements but there can be room for cost 
adjustment based on agreed terms enshrined in the contract. 
 
The fixed-price contract favors the customer by allowing them to put the project out for 
tendering. They can also receive bids and decide on the best offer but there is the 
danger of over estimation or underestimation by the contractor either which is 
detrimental to them. Nicholas (2001) stated that, ―over- estimation can result in the 
contractor losing out to a competitor while under-estimation can lead to little or no 
profit after completion‖.  
5.2.2 Cost-Plus/Cost Reimbursable Contracts 
There are variations of this type and they include. 
i) The cost sharing contract: Here, the client and the contractor agree on how costs will 
be shares. It is normally used for situation of joint project developments.  
ii) The cost plus fixed fee contract: This variation according to Nicholas (2001) ensures 
that “the contractor’s allowable costs are reimbursed and also a fixed fee is paid by 
the customer‖. This type is normally employed in research and development where 
the costs are difficult to predict and there is a desire to share risk.  
iii) The cost plus award fee contract: This contract type is based on some performance 
criteria like product quality or noise reduction. Here, payments are made to the 
contractor if he performs to the desired quality. Such payments to the contractor are 
irrespective of the agreed basic fee for the project. 
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Summarily, even though details in contracting systems are beyond the scope of this 
study, its effect on cost overrun is very visible. According to Robert (2003), ―Projects 
routinely exceed their estimated value, almost costing three or four times as much. 
Both contractors and procurement officials knew about this but deliberately 
downplayed the likely increases in order to launch their projects‖. A typical example of 
this is on the construction of The Oslo opera house. According to Olsson et all, (2003) 
the contractors applied ―a commonly used technique in major public projects, termed 
"strategic budgeting", i.e. to initiate the project using a budget that only visualizes 
parts of the total cost in order to "get the ball rolling" before the project concept is 
settled, including the project's objectives and strategy. Once the planning had gained 
momentum, the possibilities for reversing or terminating the project were limited.‖ 
Also Flyvberg et all (2002) shows that ―costs are underestimated in almost 9 out of 10 
projects. For a randomly selected project, the likelihood of actual costs being larger 
than estimated costs is 86%. The likelihood of actual costs being lower than or equal 
to estimate costs are 14%. Actual costs are on average 28% higher than estimated 
costs (SD=39). Costs are not only underestimated much more often than they are 
overestimated or correct, costs that have been underestimated are also wrong by a 
substantially larger margin than costs that have been overestimated‖. 
 
5.3 PRINCIPAL – AGENT THEORY 
 
The problems that occur when tasks are delegated to agents with private information 
led to the emergence of incentives theory. Private information here can be of three 
types: 
i) A situation where the agent can take action unobserved by the Principal, often 
referred to as the case of “moral hazard or hidden action”. 
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ii) A situation in which the agent possesses some private knowledge about his cost or 
valuation and which is ignored by the principal. This is referred to as the case of 
“adverse selection or hidden knowledge”. 
iii) A situation in which the principal and the agent share the same information but no 
third party and especially, no court of law, has access nor can observe this 
information. This is referred to as the case of “non verifiability”. 
 
Incentive theory therefore is a means of considering when this private information are 
problems to the principal and offers solutions by suggesting the optimal way for the 
principal to deal with it. The question then is “to what extent can these information 
types be a problem during contracting? 
5.3.1 PRINCIPAL – AGENT MODELS 
Model 1.  This is a case where the principal delegates a duty to one agent through the 
“take-it-or-leave-it” type of contract.  
In this model, it is assumed that; 
i) There are no bargaining problems. 
ii) There are control mechanisms (court of law) that makes sure none of the parties 
deviates from the terms of the contract. 
In this model, three types of information sharing problems exist: 
(a) Adverse selection problems. 
(b) Moral hazard problems. 
(c) Non-verifiability problems. 
All three can lead to additional costs to the project. 
Model 2.  This type is a case where the principal delegates a duty to more than one 
agent through the “take-it-or-leave-it” type of contract. Due to asymmetric information, 
each agent might adopt an individualistic behavior thus affecting interaction amongst 
fellow agents. It may also lead to collusion amongst agents with the principal being 
worse off.  
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Summarily, the problems that arose as a result of how information are shared 
amongst parties during the execution of any project can very well result to non 
achievement of the projects set objectives. According to Laffont and Martimort (2002), 
―the mere existence of informational constraints may generally prevent the Principal 
from achieving (cost) allocation efficiency‖. Simply put, these strategic behaviors by 
either or all parties certainly incur additional costs that were unbudgeted in the initial 
cost estimation resulting in cost overruns. 
5.4. GOVERNANCE AND RELATIONSHIP MECHANISMS  
 
Contracts can never include completely detailed agreements covering all possible 
future contingencies. (Robert 2003) stated that such incompleteness can be due to 
two facts:  
(i) ―parties are incapable of efficiently contracting over measures of performance that 
cannot be verified‖.   
(ii) ―at times, it can be deliberate in the sense that the parties had other reasons for 
leaving the terms in question unspecified‖.  
Mega projects, by their very nature, present major governance problems. They most 
often last for several years, with the amount involved running into billions. Perritt, Jr. 
(1996) noted that ―fragmentation in the institutional structure of employee relations in 
the construction industry frequently made it difficult to establish and maintain a 
coherent set of relationships and work rules, while (at the same time) protecting a 
project from disruptions arising from incompleteness of (written down) contracts. As a 
result, governance mechanisms are put in place for such projects‖. 
Governance is therefore concerned with accountability and responsibilities; it 
describes how the day to day running of an organization is directed and controlled 
(OGC journal 2010). The journal further stated that governance is concerned with:  
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• organization - the organizational units and structures, groupings, and co-coordinating 
mechanisms established within the organization and in partnership with external 
bodies, for the management of change. 
• management - the roles and responsibilities established to manage business change 
and operational services, and the scope of the power and authority which they 
exercise. 
• policies - the frameworks and boundaries established for making decisions about 
investment in business change, and the context and constraints within which 
decisions are taken”.  
5.4.1 FORMS OF GOVERNANCE 
Williamson (1975) identified three fundamental forms of transaction governance: 
MARKET: Autonomous parties‟ exchanges are governed by prices in supply-demand 
equilibrium 
HIERARCHY: Transactions among parties occur under a unified owner, who settles 
disputes by administrative fiat 
HYBRID: “Long-term contractual relations that preserve (parties‟) autonomy, but at the 
same time providing added transaction-specific safeguards as compared with the 
market.” 
Summarily, delivering a project on time and within budget depends on how well the 
activities of the departments and the individuals concerned are coordinated. 
According to Ram Singh (2009), ―activities of the contractor are governed by market 
contracts. On the other hand, efforts of government officials are determined by the 
hierarchical relations among and within the government organizations. Each mode of 
governance is subject to failure. Such failures, among other factors, can cause delays 
and cost overruns‖. 
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5.5 INCENTIVES AND MOTIVATIONAL MECHANISMS. 
 
Most project organizations these days, has enough managerial experience to tackle 
any type of project, nonetheless, this alone do not guarantee the successful 
completion of the project as originally planned. This is due to the fact that when stake 
holders in any given project have diverging interests, there always are the possibilities 
of cost and time overrun. To guard against possible cost overrun, the idea of 
incentives was introduced in contracts. 
5.5.1 INCENTIVES MECHANISM TYPES 
i) Profit sharing incentives: Rose and Manley (2005) while quoting Bower et all 
(2002), stated that the primary aim of financial incentives mechanism is to ―simply 
take advantage of the contractor’s general objective to maximize his profits by giving 
him the opportunity to earn a greater profit if he performs the contract efficiently‖ 
A cost under – or overrun from the actual construction cost is shared between the 
principal and the contractors in a predetermined ratio. Therefore, both the principal 
and the contractor works together to reduce the actual costs. The contractors‟ 
motivation is maximizing his profit margin above his specified fee by taking a share of 
the benefits from a reduced project cost while the principal‟s motivation lies in his 
reduction of the total amount paid out.   
ii) Bonus/Penalty Performance incentive: this incentive mechanism is 
based on the achievement of set performance target. It acts as an extra motivation to 
contractors aside that already set aside for meeting or exceeding the least acceptable 
performance level. The amount paid out here as incentive is determined from 
evaluations carried out during or after the project. 
Bonus financial incentives act on other areas of the project aside from cost. It can be 
either schedule or technical incentives and include – operation, non-disturbance, 
design integrity, safety and quality. 
In schedule incentives, the expected motivation lies in the bonus offered to the 
contractor for completing the project earlier than target.  
 45 
In technical incentives, bonus is given to the contractor as regards – efficient 
operation, non-disturbances to clients and third parties, minimization of risks and 
accidents, achieving the desired and predetermined level of quality and maintaining 
design integrity by adhering to the original design intentions.  
 
Summarily, Incentives, when strategically applied in consideration of a project context, 
leads to motivation (Rose and Manley, 2005). The process of incentives requires the 
sharing of financial risk and control between the owner and the contractor, according 
to a ratio established in the project design stage. This helps suppress the negative 
effects of diverging interests. For large scale and mega-projects which involves 
hundreds of billions of money, incentives can be a method in which millions, which 
would otherwise have been lost in overruns are saved through the much lower cost of 
incentives. 
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CHAPTER 6. LITERATURE REVIEWS ON CAUSES OF COST OVERRUN 
 
There are much published literatures and reports which indicate that cost overruns in 
infrastructure projects are a global phenomenon. But reasons as to why theses 
overruns occur are not quite as much documented. Below are some published 
literatures on the issue of causes of cost overrun.  
 
Work conducted by Nils Olsson, Kjell Austeng, Knut Samset and Ola Lædre looked 
into “CHALLENGES IN FRONT-END MANAGEMENT OF PROJECTS”. Their research 
work conducted regarding the construction of some mega projects within Norway 
show that ―uncertainty affecting projects is commonly considered to be at its highest at 
the outset and gradually decreases as the project is planned and implemented (and 
this is) partly because of increased access to relevant information‖. 
They took a look into the offshore oil and gas development projects where available 
analysis conducted by a Norwegian Parliamentary committee (Kaasen, 1999) showed 
that there is “a total budget overrun of 13% or 3 470 million Euro for the total set of 
projects between 1994 and 1998‖.  
The major reason the group gave for such budget overrun was that ―different 
stakeholders in a project at times have entirely different interests in a project with 
different project concepts. This means that there might not be a uniform desire to get 
a neutral analysis of all available alternatives‖.  
 
 Ram Singh in his work “COST AND TIME OVERRUNS IN INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROJECTS: EXTENT, CAUSES AND REMEDIES” investigated various issues related to 
delays and cost overruns in publically funded infrastructure projects. The study was 
based on, a large data-set of 850 projects across seventeen infrastructure sectors in 
India. At the end of the study, he found and divided the causes of project cost 
overruns into four subgroups which include: 
A. TECHNICAL AND NATURAL FACTORS: He stated that the “estimation of project time 
and cost for infrastructure projects is a characteristically complex exercise. Though 
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the estimation techniques have become better and sophisticated in recent times, still 
they are imperfect. As work on a project starts, its future unfolds and the authorities 
along with the contractor become better informed about the specific technological and 
material requirements of the project.” Such new information may ―necessitate changes 
that may require extra time as well as funds‖. 
B.THE CONTRACTUAL FAILURES: Ram Singh also stated that “in principle, contracts 
known as complete-contingent-contracts should ensure that project is completed on 
time and within budget………but in reality, however, the initial contract cannot fully 
describe every possible scenario that may unfold during the construction phase. 
Therefore, some of the cost overruns are caused by what we have called the 
contractual incompleteness which increases with the project size.‖ 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL OR INSTITUTIONAL FAILURES: The third reason cited by Ram 
Singh as reason for cost overrun was organizational or institutional failure. He noted 
that ―real world hierarchy based organizations, especially the government 
organizations, are inherently weak in inducing the desired efforts from the people 
involved‖. He also said that ―incentives created by government organizations are 
particularly weak thus at every stage of hierarchy there is a conflict between the 
individual and the social objectives. The resulting effect of such is that, “infrastructure 
projects have to face the consequences of many sources of failures within the 
sponsoring organization‖. 
D. ECONOMIC FACTORS: He finally noted that ―economic aspects of the place where a 
project is located can also affect the project time and costs‖. He was of the opinion 
that ‖projects located in developed regions have lower cost and time overrun than 
those within less and developing countries‖. This is because the up to date 
infrastructure will help in execution of projects. 
 
 “POLICY AND PLANNING FOR LARGE INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS: PROBLEMS, 
CAUSES, CURES” by Bent Flyvbjerg contain research work on budget overruns in the 
transport sector. He found out that ―9 out of 10 projects have cost overrun among the 
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20 nations and 5 continents covered by the study”. He observed that ―overrun is 
constant for the 70-year period covered by the study and that estimates have not 
improved over time‖. 
He offered some explanations on the causes of budget overruns and these he 
grouped into three headings.  
A. TECHNICAL EXPLANATIONS: in terms of imperfect forecasting techniques, 
inadequate data, honest mistakes, inherent problems in predicting the future, lack of 
experience on the part of forecasters, etc. 
B. PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS: decisions based on delusional optimism rather 
than on a rational weighting of gains, losses, and probabilities. Planners overestimate 
benefits and underestimate costs. They involuntarily spin scenarios of success and 
overlook the potential for mistakes and miscalculations. As a result, planners and 
promoters pursue initiatives that are unlikely to come in on budget or on time, or to 
ever deliver the expected returns.  
C. POLITICAL-ECONOMIC EXPLANATIONS: Political-economic explanations see planners 
and promoters as deliberately and strategically overestimating benefits and 
underestimating costs when forecasting the outcomes of projects. They do this in 
order to increase the likelihood that it is their projects, and not the competition's, that 
gain approval and funding.‖ 
 
 “WHY PROJECTS OVERRUN AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT” by Richard E. Westney 
noted that ―in spite of the excitement of $100/bbl oil, the majority of energy industry 
executives are dissatisfied with project performance (40% of capital projects overrun); 
this level of dissatisfaction is the highest ever.‖ 
He went further to note that ―everyone in the industry is aware of the major cost 
overruns and schedule delays associated with major projects but they often 
overlooked the  fact that these overruns are often announced when projects are well 
into construction—long past sanction and at a time when traditional project risks have 
(or should have) been mitigated‖ 
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He quoted causes of cost overruns to include ―changes that are required to make the 
facility work but are not included in the basis of design.‖ He listed them ―as changes in 
legislation, infrastructure capacity, or local conditions.‖ Other reasons stated as 
causes of overrun are:  
A. MARKET CONDITIONS – includes both general worldwide economic conditions as 
well as specific trends, such as worldwide contractor backlog for critical capabilities 
associated with the project‟s requirements and location. 
B. LOCATION FACTORS – includes geo-political risks, taxes and regulations, 
extraordinary environmental conditions, etc. 
Commercial or partner requirements and behaviors – includes misalignment of 
business goals, host country laws and regulations, financing issues, etc. 
C. ORGANIZATION (INTERNAL) RISKS – Includes risks typically associated with an 
asymmetry between size, complexity, location, and risks of a project and the 
organization‟s ability to deliver. These risks can be assessed by looking at such 
variables as: 
- Resource requirements and availability, skills, and ability to be effective. 
- Work processes, methods, systems, and effectiveness for the project‟s size and 
complexity”. 
In summary, the author is of the opinion that ―projects overrun because most owners 
and contractor organizations lack a practical and disciplined approach to Strategic 
Risk Management – as a result, strategic risks and volatility are seldom understood or 
mitigated effectively‖. 
 
Perhaps the work that captures closest the causes of cost overrun in oil and gas 
projects was the report of the research conducted by the INVESTMENT COMMITTEE 
(INVESTERINGSURVALGET) 1998 set up by the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy to analyze the trend in investment on the Norwegian continental shelf. The 
main task of the group was to find the reasons why investments have increased 
compared to the original plans for all oil and gas projects approved from 1994 to 
 50 
1998. In their evaluations, the group summarized their findings by grouping them into 
the following headlines: 
A. DECISION-MAKING BASIS, BUDGET, AND RISK COMPREHENSION: The report stated 
that the majority of the PDO estimates have been unrealistic due to: 
      * exaggerated optimism based on positive trends (at the period in question). 
     * unison unrealistic ambitions regarding substantial, further improvements and little 
comprehension of the uncertainty resulting from thin project maturing and introducing 
of new elements. 
B. DRILLING AND COMPLETION: The committee found out that production and injection 
wells accounted for 33% of the total cost overrun. The report stated that the operators 
did not “to a sufficiently detailed extent plan their drilling operations in connection with 
the preparation of the PDO‖. As a result the operators complained of ―reservoir 
complexity and technologically advanced wells‖ they had to deal with. 
C.TECHNOLOGY: The introduction of new technology different from the old but tested 
and trusted method was found to have resulted in cost overrun. The report stated that 
―the implementation of new technology has introduced major factors of uncertainty 
which have not been paid sufficient attention in budgeting and implementation of the 
projects‖. 
D. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION: It was also the opinion of the committee that the time 
periods allocated for projects implementation were too short and as such contributed 
to cost overrun. They stated that ―the amount of time in the phase prior to initiation of 
the project and the time of the actual project has been reduced” as such there was 
―limited possibility to solve unforeseen problems in one phase without having 
consequences for the next phase‖. 
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CHAPTER 7. DATA ANALYSIS 
 
7.1 ESTIMATED SNØHVIT PROJECT TIME SCHEDULE 
 
Figure 16: ESTIMATED OVERALL TIME SCHEDULE 
        
                                                                                                      © Tractebel Gas Engineering 
 
The above figure shows the estimated time schedule for the entire Snøhvit project 
constructions. The entire project time was estimated at 5 years with the start up in 
early 2002 and finishing time of early 2006. It was expected that the first supply of gas 
will take place mid 2006. Detailed analyses shows that the entire phase 1 was divided 
into two separate projects parts each with separate but inter-lapping time frames. 
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PART 1:  FIELD AND PIPELINE 
This is subdivided into three parts. 
(i) Subsea systems / engineering and construction - The time frame for construction 
was from the time of PDO approval of early march 2002 and continues till last quarter 
of 2005. 
(ii) Drilling – late 2004 to early 2006. 
(iii) Pipelines and Umbilical‟s - late 2002 to end of 2005 
 
PART 2:  LAND PLANT AND SHIPS 
This is also subdivided into seven parts 
(i) Engineering – projected to run throughout the time period of 2002 to early 2006 
(ii) Blasting and Jetty work – mid 2002 to mid 2004 (two years) 
(iii) Construction of storage tanks - March 2003 to October 2005 
(iv) Construction of process plant – mid 2002 to mid 2005 
(v) Mechanical installation – mid 2004 to mid 2005 (1 year) 
(vi) Hook up Testing – June 2005 to Nov. 2005 
(vii) Building of LNG carriers – April 2004 to Jan. 2006 
 
7.2 STORAGE AND LOADING FACILITY SCHEDULE 
 
TABLE 5: STORAGE AND LOADING FACILITY CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE. 
                                                                                            © Tractebel Gas Engineering 
s/no Date  Activity 
     1 July 16th, 2002. Contract was awarded to TGE 
     2 01 October 2002. Blasting plans issued 
     3 01 April 2003. Site mobilization 
     4 03 August 2005. LNG tank 1 ready for commissioning 
     5 17 August 2005 LNG tank 1 ready for operation 
     6 31 October 2005 Plant fully ready for operation 
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The storage tanks project as awarded to Tractebel Gas Engineering Company in July 
16th 2002 show the major items of the contract as: 
a. 2 x 125.000 m3 full containment LNG Tank. 
b. 75 000 m3 condensate Tank. 
c. 45 000 m3 LPG Tank. 
d. Jetty with 3 Loading Systems (1/product). 
e. Metering Systems. 
f. LNG HP – Send Out to Liquefaction Plant. 
g. LNG BOG Blower. 
h. External Flare and Incinerator. 
i. All interconnecting piping, electrical and instrumentation works. 
                                                       (source: Tractebel Gas Engineering) 
 
7.3 REAL-TIME SNOHVIT TIME STRUCTURE 
 
The tables below show (in real terms) the important dates in the construction history 
of Snøhvit. Some of the activities gave marked deviation from what was originally 
given in the estimate.    
 
TABLE 6: ACTUAL MANAGEMENT AND ENGINEERING TIME FRAME. 
 
S/No          DATE                                 ACTIVITY 
   1.        1981 Gas fields discovered in the Barents sea. 
   2.    1991-1997 An attempt was made to establish a basis for developing 
the area. The plan was for an offshore field development 
and gas liquefaction plant on Sørøya near Hammerfest 
that would sell LNG to the Italian market. Statoil halted 
the planning process, citing cost and market factors. A 
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new solution for developing the field was proposed, with 
a facility on Melkøya island outside Hammerfest and 
subsea production installations remotely operated from 
land. 
 
   3.   1991-1993  Protests against various oil companies‟ exploration 
operations in the Barents. Bellona filed suit against 
Statoil to halt drilling activities. 
 
   4.       1996 Statoil and Linde form LNG technology alliance to 
develop the mixed fluid cascade (MFC) liquefaction 
process. 
   5.       1998 New proposal submitted to the ministry in the following 
year. This included both new impact assessments and 
upgrading of preparatory work done in the previous 
development process. Carbon capture and storage now 
included in the plan. 
    6.   1998-2001 Negotiations and seminars with experts and authorities 
in Finnmark, information meetings with locals in 
Hammerfest. 
    7. December 2000 Pre-engineering phase begins. The plant design takes 
concrete form. 
    8.    April 2001 New Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) published. 
    9.     July 2001 Snøhvit‟s partners put the project on hold because of 
lack of clarity over government taxation terms. 
   10.   Sept. 2001 Special tax benefits approved by ESA. Contract with 
partners signed. Statoil submitted a plan for 
development and operation (POD) of the field. 
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   11.    Oct. 2001 Long-term sales contracts signed with El Paso LNG, 
Iberdrola, Gaz de France and Total. 
   12.   Dec. 2001 Due to poor economic situation of the project, Finance 
Minister announced that ways to support the project 
would be investigated. 
   13.   Jan. 2002 POD presented to Parliament 
Environmentalists organize intensive protests. 
   14.  March 2002 POD for LNG plant approved by Norway‟s Parliament in 
March 2002. Statoil announces that tax position is 
unclear due to the involvement of the ESA. 
  15.  April 2002 till 
present. 
In the engineering phase, construction gets underway. 
First site work is blasting, which turns Melkøya from a 
barren island into a made-to-order construction platform. 
Rock removed amount to 2.3 million cubic meters 
(including road tunnel to mainland), enough to fill Great 
Pyramid to the tip. Volume of concrete eventually placed 
is 60,000 cubic meters. 
  16.    May 2002 May 2002 Pollution Control Authority allows Statoil to 
start construction work (preparation of the site and filling 
of land). 
  17.   July 2002 Resolution of the tax position by the ESA. 
  18.  August 2002 Construction phase begins as plant components are built 
at Melkøya and elsewhere in Europe. 
  19.  August 2002 Statoil announces that delays caused by the ESA tax 
investigation have increased costs by € 130 million. 
  20. Oct./Dec.2002   Following a detailed project review, CEO says that the 
project‟s management and organization need to be 
strengthened to ensure cost control and progress: costs 
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have risen by € 740 million, to 5.75 billion. 
  21. June 2003 EFTA court rules against Bellona‟s action against the 
ESA20 Case 24 ECN-E--07-058. 
  22. July 2003 At La Coruna, Spain, the process barge is launched on 
July 11th. Pumps, heat exchangers, compressors and 
the power plant with its five gas turbines will later be 
installed on this huge “floating island”. 
  23.       2003 Installation work on the barge begins at Cadiz. 
  24.  June 2004 The “slug catcher” is finished at Zwijndrecht, 
Netherlands. This system of large branched pipes 
separates entrained moisture and sledges from gas 
delivered via the pipeline. 
  25. June-Oct2004 Following an „extraordinary review‟, Statoil‟s board is 
notified that costs could rise by a further € 510-760 
million. Risk of delay by 6-12 months. Measures 
implemented to deal with failures by contractors and 
equipment suppliers. Statoil‟s cost overruns discussed in 
the Oil and Energy Ministry and Parliament. 
  26.   August 2004 Monoethylene glycol tanks are finished in Sicily and 
soon afterwards shipped to Hammerfest. A pipeline 
carries monoethylene glycol from the island to the well, 
where it is added to the mixture of gas, water and 
condensate. Its function is to prevent the formation of 
solid hydrates at the wellhead and during transport to 
land. 
   27.    April 2005 The cold box, the liquefier proper, is finished at Antwerp. 
The heart of the LNG plant, this unit was pre-fabricated 
at Lindes Schalchen works (in Bavaria) and at Bremen; 
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final assembly took place In Belgium. The 62 meter tall 
tower is next carried to Hammerfest by a heavy-lift 
vessel (HLV). 
  28.    June 2005 Workers at the Cadiz yard finish the topside, the 
superstructure on the process barge. In the Gulf of 
Cadiz, the barge now weighing 25,000 tonnes is loaded 
piggyback-fashion on the HLV Blue Marlin. 
  29. June 2005 Partners launch studies to assess doubling the plant‟s 
capacity. 
  30. 30th June 2005  The barge secured on board Blue Marlin departs Gulf of 
Cadiz, bound for Hammerfest. The voyage lasted eleven 
days with a voyage distance of 2,700 nautical miles. 
  31.   July 2005 Hammerfest Energy submits EIS for 100 MW power 
plant to Pollution Control Authority, and complains in 
public that Statoil has refused to contribute to its project. 
  32.   Sept. 2005 New review reveals that cost estimates have risen and 
further delays are expected. Cost estimate rises to €7.42 
billion. Deliveries scheduled to begin in December 2007. 
Statoil starts to secure alternative supplies to US and 
Spanish customers. 
  33.   Nov.2005 Remote control system and power relay tested and 
remote monitoring system in operation. 
  34. 21st Aug2007 The valves were opened of Snøhvit wells in Barents Sea 
and gas flowed through 143–kilometer pipeline to land 
and in the plant at Melkøya, where the well flow is 
separated into natural gas and condensate. 
  35. 13th Sep2007 Statoil commenced production of LNG at the 
Hammerfest LNG plant 
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  36. 2007, 1st Dec The gas is accepted for commercial production and 
delivery commences. 
Sources: Norway online 2006; Kårsta 2002; Natur og Ungdom 2002; Bellona 2006; Petroleum Economist 2006 and 
Linde Technology 2006. 
 
 
The important observation from the table above is the time it finally took for gas 
production and delivery to commence. Gas production began in 1 June 2007 and 
regular gas deliveries started on 1 December 2007. This is eight months later than 
originally estimated. 
 
7.4 SNØHVIT COST ESTIMATE 
 
The final plan for “Development and Operation” (PDO) of Snøhvit field was approved 
on the 7th day of March 2002, by the Norwegian parliament. Also approved on the 
same day was the “Plan for Installation and Operation” (PIO) of the gas liquefaction 
plant at Melkøya Island near Hammerfest including a subsea development linked 
through pipeline to the receiving terminal and liquefaction plant at Melkøya. The 
processed LNG will be exported using specially made ships to terminals in the USA 
and southern Europe.  
The project was estimated at NOK39.5 billion, excluding the LNG carriers with plans 
to start production in 2006 and lasting until about 2030. It was expected that jobs at 
Melkøya in the construction phase will total up to 1,200 work-years while land based 
operation facilities will need about 180 permanent employees drawn from the local 
area.  
Phase 1 has an investment budget of 23.2 billion in 2001-kroner. Phase 1 includes the 
LNG plant at Melkøya, pipeline to shore and the development of the Snøhvit field. 
Costs for shipping of LNG will be added based on a new construction program, and is 
estimated to approx. 5.4 billion. The project's total investments as approved in 2001 
(excluding ships) and even up till 2021 are shown in the table below. 
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TABLE 7: TOTAL INVESTMENT COST AS APPROVED IN 2001 
 
   Cost item Cost (million 2001 – NOK) 
Concept design for PDO / PIO                              262 
Project management                              247 
Snøhvit field                           7 257 
Hammerfest LNG plant                        14 917 
Operations Preparation                              524 
Total Phase 1                         23 207 
Askeladd field and compression country (Phase 2)                           4 555 
Albatross field (phase 3)                           2 147 
Compression and future offshore installations (phase 4),                           4 340 
Total                          34 249 
                                                                                                Source: oil and energy department                                                  
                                         
7.5 COSTS OVERRUN 
 
Within the total period of construction of the project, a review of the construction cost 
was formally made a total number of four times. In 2008 another review was made 
when it became glaring that the last cost estimate was less than realistic. Table below 
is the summary of the reviews. 
 
TABLE 8: SUMMARY OF COST REVIEWS FOR SNØHVIT 
 
S/NO     DATE                              PARTICULARS OF REVIEWS 
1 7th March 2002 Plan for development and operation approved for Snøhvit. 
The project cost estimated at NOK39.5 billion.  
2 13th Dec. 2002 Upward review of the cost from NOK39.5 billion to NOK45.3 
billion. This is an additional NOK5.8 billion. 
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3 11th June 2005 Upward cost review showed cost rise between NOK4 – 6 
billion. New cost estimate now between NOK49.3 – 51.3 
billion. 
4 21st Aug. 2005 Another upward review to NOK58.3 billion. This is an 
increase of NOK7 billion from the last estimate. 
5 15th Oct. 2008 An upward review to Euro 8 billion. This is an increase of 
Euro 2 billion from the last budget of 2005   
                                                                     Sources: oil and energy department, Statoil Observer and Barents observer. 
 
 
7.6 COST OVERRUN ANALYSIS  
 
7.6.1 THE FIRST REVIEW: This was the first cost review after the plan for 
development and operation (PDO) was approved. The review was on the 13th of 
December 2002. The analysis showed an upward review of NOK5.8 billion. This gives 
a 14.7% increase from what was estimated initially.  
REASON CITED FOR THE INCREASE: According to Egil Gjesteland, the project director 
for Snøhvit, the reason for the cost increase was that ―the plant’s capacity was 
increased by 30% at an early stage. At the same time, the consequences of such an 
expansion in a large gas liquefaction facility were under-estimated‖. He also stated 
that ―costs rose because the start of the construction work was delayed by 
discussions with the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) over the tax regime for the 
project‖. 
 
7.6.2 THE SECOND REVIEW: This was carried out in the middle of 2005. The new 
cost estimate showed an increase by NOK4 – 6 billion to give a new cost of between 
NOK49.3 – 51.3 billion.  This means an increase of 24.8% to 29.8% from the first 
original estimate of NOK39.5 billion. 
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REASON CITED FOR THE INCREASE:  The acting chief executive of Statoil Egil Øverland 
said that ―Snøhvit is one of the most extensive and technically complex projects we’ve 
ever launched‖. He also noted that they ―have under-estimated its complexity and we 
acknowledge that the project was not sufficiently matured when the decision to 
develop was taken in 2001‖. He went further to give details of why there was a cost 
increase and they were stated below. 
 The project insufficient maturity at the time when the decision to develop was 
taken. 
 Lacking and delayed deliveries of drawing and materials from the main 
contractor. 
 Late mobilization and poor productivity at the main yard. 
 Tests carried out in May 2004 show that the key refrigeration compressors 
have to be modified to meet the specifications. 
  
7.6.3 THE THIRD REVIEW: This was carried out in August of 2005. Breakdown of 
the figures indicated an upward cost estimation to NOK58.3 billion which is an 
increase of NOK7 billion from the last estimate. This amounts to a 47.5% increase 
from the original estimate of NOK39.5 billion. 
REASON CITED FOR THE INCREASE: The chief executive of Statoil, Helge Lund stated 
after the review that “the Snøhvit project has struggled with problems from the onset, 
mainly because the project was not sufficiently mature when it was sanctioned in 
2001. The new review of costs and progress has revealed that control of the project 
has been insufficient and we have not managed to correct the imbalances in the 
project quickly‖. He therefore gave the reasons for the cost increase as: 
 Delayed engineering. 
 Quality flaws and delays to modules from continental Europe which in turn led 
to transfer of work to Melkøya. 
 Underestimation of the scope of work, particularly within the electrification 
discipline. 
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 Extra work at Melkøya which prolongs project execution and raises cost at 
initial stage.  
 
7.6.4 THE FOURTH REVIEW: As part of the authorities' annual updating of projects 
under development, Statoil management on 15th of October 2008 submitted a revised 
cost of developing the Snøhvit LNG project. The latest estimates show that the project 
will be NOK13 to 16 billion more expensive than what was assumed three years ago 
in 2005. This puts the new estimate to between NOK71.3 and 74.3 billion. 
A breakdown of the new cost estimate shows that NOK3 billion will be needed for the 
final construction of phase 1 which gives a final cost of NOK48.1 billion in nominal 
terms compared to what was estimated in September 2005.  
The reason cited by Statoil management for this cost increase was the problems they 
had with the completion of the onshore plant. 
NOK 2.5 to 5.5 billion was needed to solve the problems associated with regularity 
and capacity. They will have to bring the plant to the planned capacity in order to 
ensure stable and safe operations.  
 
Also needed is an additional NOK7.5 billion related to the future development of 
Snøhvit for the period 2015 to 2032. The total estimated investment in Phase 2- 4 is 
20.8 billion, which is 7.5 billion more than projected in September 2005. 
REASON CITED FOR THE INCREASE: This increase was for the cost of future drilling rigs 
and other equipment. As yet, no contracts have been signed for this work and Statoil 
has not made a final concept for the future compression solution on the field. There is 
therefore considerable uncertainty about this estimate. 
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CHAPTER 8. COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ORMEN-LANGE LNG PROJECT 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In order to appreciate fully the findings of this research work, an attempt is hereby 
made to compare two liquefied natural gas projects constructed within Norway – the 
Snøhvit and Ormen-Lange. Ormen-Lange was noted to have been completed without 
much cost and within schedule; Snøhvit on the other hand was riddled with cost 
escalations and time overrun. Both projects are similar in nature and were carried out 
within Norway and as such, one would have thought that Snøhvit should have been 
completed with little or no case of cost overrun. 
Earlier chapters concentrated on Snøhvit LNG project, thus this chapter delved more 
on Ormen-Lange LNG project. The aim was to identify what procedure they took that 
resulted in the project sticking to budget and schedule. 
 
8.2 OVERVIEW OF THE ORMEN-LANGE LNG PROJECT 
 
Ormen Lange was discovered in 1997 and is the first true deepwater (850 – 1100 
meters) project in Norway. The gas fields are located in the North Sea at a distance of 
about 120kilometers from North West of Kristiansund with the gas reservoir lying 3000 
meters below the sea surface and cover an area about 40 kilometers long and 8 to 10 
kilometers wide. The field is embedded at the centre of a depression left behind from 
the Storegga mudslide. The ocean floor is highly rugged – with 30-60 meter peaks 
protruding from the seabed due to the slide. The wells exist in an area with ambient 
weather conditions coupled with sub-zero water temperatures at seabed. The gas 
stream is sent via pipeline to an onshore processing plant at Nyhamna. 
On arrival at Nyhamna, the untreated well stream is first sent to its first stop - the slug 
catcher. This removes slugs – or fluid plugs – which have the capacity of filling and 
damaging the process systems. After that, the gas, condensate, water and antifreeze 
are all separated using different processes. The gas is dewatered and desiccated, 
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before undergoing compression for export, 1200 km to Easington-UK, in what is to be 
known as the world‟s longest offshore gas pipeline, Langeled .The condensate (light 
oil) is stabilized and stockpiled in a 150,000 cubic meter rock cavern, and exported by 
tankers. The antifreeze is separated and recycled. Any produced water is thoroughly 
cleansed, and then released into the sea. At its plateau production, Ormen Lange will 
process some 20 billion standard cubic meters of gas per annum. This is equivalent to 
Norway‟s entire energy consumption thus making Norway, the world‟s second largest 
exporter of natural gas. Ormen Lange production wells are known as “big bore” gas 
wells and are the largest in the world, with 9 5/8-inch pipe dimensions. (www.hydro.com) 
8.3 THE ORMEN-LANGE PROJECT DEVELOPMENT 
 
The plan for development and operation for Ormen Lange was submitted to the 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy on Thursday 4th December 2003 at an estimated 
cost NOK 66 billion. Phase 1 of the development, involving the Langeled gas pipeline, 
the land-based process plant at Nyhamna and offshore installations on the Ormen 
Lange gas field itself, was completed within the total budget of NOK 50 billion in 2003 
NOK (statoil). Constructed was started in 2004 and despite being one of the largest 
and most demanding industry projects ever carried out in Norway or indeed globally, 
the field started production almost two weeks ahead of the 1 October plan on 13 
September and will continue for up to 40 years. 
 FIGURE 17: ORMEN-LANGE TIME LINE 
                                                                                                                     (www.hydro.com)           
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8.3.1 GAS PROCESSING COMPLEX 
The processing plant is sited at Nyhamna in Aukra commune in Møre and Romsdal, 
Norway. On arrival at the plant, the crude well stream is first sent to a reception facility 
(slug catcher) where liquid condensate slugs are removed. This prevents damage to 
some areas of the processing facility. The task of the slug catcher is to separate the 
crude stream into gas, liquid condensate, water and antifreeze.  
The processed gas then pass on to a gas dew pointing unit where it is compressed for 
export. The water is cleaned and discharged to the sea. The condensate on the other 
hand is stabilized and stored underground in a storage facility awaiting export. The 
antifreeze is recycled and sent back to the wellhead.  
 
FIGURE 18: THE ORMEN–LANGE LNG PLANT AT NYHAMNA 
 
                                                                                                                                      (HYDRO) 
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8.3.2 LANGLED PIPELINE 
This is the exportation mechanism for the processed gas. It is a pipeline stretching 
1,200km from Nyhamna via Sleipner in the North Sea to Easington in the UK. It was 
expected that at the height of production the Ormen-Lange gas processing complex 
will handle 20 billion m³ per year and all these will be transported through this 
underwater pipeline which is the world's longest subsea export pipeline, The northern 
section, from Nyhamna to Sleipner, is made of 42in-diameter steel pipeline, while the 
southern section to Easington is a 44in-diameter steel pipeline. The two sections are 
connected at a junction called Sleipner which serves as a distribution and quality 
control point. It will also serve as distribution point for future branches to mainland 
Europe.  
At Easington in United Kingdom, the gas will then be distributed to fulfill supply 
contracts with industrial (power generation) and domestic distributors. 
8.4 ORMEN-LANGE CONTRACTS 
 
A notable strategy in Ormen-Lange was the manner in which the contracts were 
awarded. The jobs were divided into modules and awarded separately to individual 
contractors. By this method, each client is responsible for proper and timely execution 
of modules assigned to them. All the contracts were divided into two viz: Onshore and 
Offshore contracts. 
8.4.1 OFFSHORE CONTRACTS 
The table below lists all the offshore contracts and companies to which they were 
awarded to. 
TABLE 9:  OFFSHORE CONTRACTS AND CONTRACTORS 
S/NO COMPANY CONTRACT DESCRIPTION 
1 Reinertsen Engineering AS Engineering for the import pipeline to 
Nyhamna. 
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2 Snamprogetti The export pipeline engineering. 
3 ABB Offshore Systems The Sleipner tie-in. 
4 Bredero Shaw Norway Pipeline coating. 
5 Europipe GMBH and Mitsui & Co 
Norway 
Provision of the line pipe. 
6 Stolt Offshore AS and Allseas 
Marine Contractors SA 
Shallow water marine installations. 
7 FMC Kongsberg Subsea AS the subsea production systems 
8 Van Oord ACZ AS subsea rock installation 
9 Tenaris Global Services Service pipelines 
10 Stolt Offshore.  The monoethyleneglycol (MEG) 
installation and pipelines 
11 Saipem Installation and tie in deep water 
12 Provided by Nexans and installed by 
Subsea 7. 
 
Umbilicals 
13 Heetema Heavy liftings 
14 Nexans Subsea dredging  
15 Geoconsult Marine surveying 
16 NorSea Group, Olympic Shipping, 
District Offshore, Solstad Shipping 
and Havila Shipping. 
Line pipe transportation 
                                                                                                                  (Source: www.hydro.com) 
8.4.2 ONSHORE CONTRACTS 
 
TABLE 10: ONSHORE CONTRACTS AND CONTRACTORS 
 
S/NO COMPANY CONTRACT DESCRIPTION 
1 Aker Kaeverner Engineering, procurement, management, construction and 
architecture (EPMCA) for the gas complex (receiving and 
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export). Other onshore infrastructure including the flare 
tower, slug catcher and emergency shutdown systems. 
 
2 Multiconsult and 
Skanska 
Civil engineering for the gas complex 
3 Aker Kaeverner Construction of gas reception and export area. 
4 Vetco Aibel AS Engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) of jetty. 
5 Aker Stord Design and install all process systems and utility systems, 
including civil engineering, steel structure, pipe work, 
HVAC, mechanical engineering, electrical installation, 
instrumentation installation, insulation and surface 
protection 
6 Midsund Bruk Process equipment for the separation of condensate, gas 
and water will be constructed 
                                                                                                                                                   (Source: www.hydro.com) 
 
8.5 MAJOR SIMILARITIES BETWEEN SNØHVIT AND ORMEN-LANGE LNG 
PROJECTS 
 
Snøhvit and Ormen-Lange are both mega natural gas projects and shares some 
identical physical characteristics which include: 
1. Complete subsea production facilities in combination with onshore  
2. Pipelines and umbilical‟s to and fro shore for liquid streams. 
3. Onshore processing plant for liquid streams.   
4. Harsh and ambient weather conditions. 
5. Construction and production within the same economic time period.   
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FIGURE 19: SUBSEA PROCESSES OF ORMEN-LANGE  
 
 
                                                                                                                  (www.hydro.com) 
 
8.6 OTHER INSTALLATIONS IN NYHAMNA 
a. Landfall for pipelines, shut-off valves and pig traps. 
b. Slug catchers for removal of liquid plugs. 
c. Process systems for separation and treatment of condensate 
d. Facilities for drying and compressing gas for export 
e. Condensate treatment facilities 
f. Glycol recycling plant 
g. Flare tower 
h. Unit for fiscal metering of gas 
i. Rock cavern for condensate storage 
j. Loading jetty for condensate 
k. Utilities including air-, water-, and heating unit, etc. 
l. Transformers.  
m. Offices and control room 
 70 
8.6.1 ORMEN-LANGE PHASE 1 SCOPE OF WORK 
Phase 1 of Ormen-Lange development involved the Langeled gas pipeline, the land-
based process plant at Nyhamna and other offshore installations. Below lists all the 
developments that are part of phase 1. 
a. Eight (8) enhanced horizontal 7″ 10,000 psi subsea trees.  
b. Separate installable-retrievable choke modules. 
c. Nine (9) UWD-15 subsea wellhead systems. 
d. Two (2) 8-slot foundation bottom structures and manifold systems with 20″ headers   
including 30″ pig-loop system. 
e. One (1) PLET (pipeline end termination) module. 
f. KS-200 control systems with fiber optic as primary communication system. 
g. Electro-hydraulic Work-Over Control Systems (WOCS) with XT, LS and HSW 
umbilical systems. 
h. Open sea Lower Riser Package (LRP) and Emergency. 
i. Disconnect Package (EDP). 
j. Drill pipe landing string system. 
k. Choke module running tool, Module Running Tool (MRT) and ROV tooling system. 
l. Large-bore tie-in system for 20″/30″ clamp connectors. 
m. Small-bore tie-in system for less than 14″ collect connectors. 
n. System Integration testing, installation assistance, service and maintenance.  
                                                                                                               (Hydro.com) 
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8.7 MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BOTH PROJECTS 
 
8.7.1 ADOPTED TECHNOLOGIES 
 
This probably is one of the main reasons for cost budget differences between the two 
projects. It had been shown earlier that Snøhvit adopted a completely new technology 
– the mixed fluid cascade – which makes use of recycled gas for its operations. It is a 
method where CO2, separated from the produced gas onshore, are sent back offshore 
via pipeline for re-injection to a suitable reservoir. This is an entirely new engineering 
concept which has never been tried before.  
Ormen-Lange on its part adopted a tested and trusted conventional technology – 
natural separation – of which the contractors has complete control of and as such did 
not present much technical problems. 
8.7.2 CONTRACT METHODS 
 
The major contract of Snøhvit was more like a single packaged contract in which the 
entire job of building the gas plant was contracted to one company, Linde technology.  
In Ormen-Lange, the operators split the project into individual modules and awarded 
separate contracts for them. Around a third of these contracts were awarded to 
Norwegian contractors, who duly won them amidst stiff competition with players from 
other countries. 
 
8.8 EXECUTION STRATEGY FOR ORMEN-LANGE 
 
The first notable execution strategy by the operators of Ormen-Lange was the 
foresight shown by modifying and extending the time frame postponing the 
submission of the plan for development and production (PDO) to the Norwegian 
authorities until fall 2003. This move was necessitated by studies and tests which 
reveal there was a need to use more time mapping and doing essential preliminary 
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work to determine the best concept and to optimize well placement. Even though the 
extension resulted in a new production start-up date in fall 2007, it undoubtedly secure 
more time for finalizing details which would have been bottle necks during 
construction thereby causing cost escalations. 
The second strategy employed was the move to award some contracts prior to PDO 
approval. This was done in order to maintain the time schedule of the project. The 
operators showed an early commitment as regards key suppliers and contractors, by 
awarding contracts for services like line pipe material, pipeline installation, large-
diameter and high-pressure pipeline valves, pipeline coating and anodes, tie-in and 
testing before the PDO was approved. The gain from such move was in securing 
capacity and process level for services needed for the project.  Though this method 
involves some extent of risk if for any reason the project was not sanctioned as 
anticipated, it nevertheless ensures that capacity was secured before market prices 
escalated in 2003/2004. By acting in this manner, Statoil had frame agreements 
established with the most important contractors and services. This was clearly 
beneficial for the project as its cost estimate was not really affected by market price 
escalation in 2003. 
Another strategy employed by Hydro during the projects execution was the splitting 
the project - the pipeline fabrication and construction works into separate units and 
contracts awarded separately for each one. This ensures good enough balance of risk 
between the principal and clients. By splitting and awarding individual contacts, the 
operators was able to control the whole project by ensuring that contractors take on 
jobs (and risks) that they have experience to take and can control.  
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CHAPTER 9. RESEARCH FINDINGS IN RELATION TO LOGISTIC 
THEORIES. 
 
9.1 INCOMPREHENSIVE ESTIMATION OF SCOPE OF THE PROJECT.  
The first finding of this research work was that there wasn‟t a clear and 
comprehensive estimation of the scope of the entire project as at the time the PDO 
was approved. Changes in both the original engineering design and the project 
execution methods were on numerous occasions reported. These therefore resulted 
in significant increases in the work-scope of several of the activities as against what 
was originally planned and budgeted.  
A major example of the above was the decision in 1999 to increase planned output by 
30% to 5.67bn cubic meters a year (cm/y) of LNG. The company miscalculated the 
increased construction costs associated with such an increment. A detailed 
engineering cost analysis later showed that the calculations were wrong as they did 
not reflect the new capacity of the plant. 
In May 2004, key refrigeration compressors had to be modified to meet the 
specifications. Also increased, to a huge degree, were the weight of some of the 
modules resulting in the decision to move the cooling tower off the process barge, due 
to the large increase in the weight of the topsides plant. This alone resulted in cost 
increase to NOK58.3 billion and first contractual shipments being rescheduled to 
December 2007. 
These are only just a few of such changes to the originally approved scope of the 
project as there were other numerous changes hereby not mentioned. The 
consequence of such changes can only be in one direction – cost and time overrun. 
For instance, the first upward cost review of the project in 2002.  Statoil in their annual 
report of 2002 states that, ―the total development costs for the project are estimated to 
be NOK 45.3 billion......... but following the projects review, the investment cost 
estimate was increased by NOK 5.8 billion in the autumn of 2002, due to 
underestimated scope of work and the delayed start-up‖. 
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Another reference to this was the ―underestimations of the scope of work, particularly 
within the electrical discipline resulting to extra work at Melkøya which prolongs 
project execution and raises costs in the final stage‖. This shortcoming was even 
admitted by the then project director for Snøhvit, Egil Gjesteland when he gave 
reason for the cost increase as the increment at an early stage, the capacity of the 
plant, ―but at the same time, the consequences of such an expansion in a large gas 
liquefaction facility were underestimated.‖ Even Statoil‟s chief executive officer Helge 
Lund reiterated this shortcoming when he stated that, ―the project, huge in its scale 
and complexity, had not been sufficiently mature at the time of sanction”.  
It therefore follows from the above that Snøhvit was not developed so far, (there were 
too many changes), as to allow development elements to be well estimated with 
reasonable certainty prior to the approval of the PDO.  
 
9.2 QUALITY FLAWS IN ENGINEERING WORKS. 
 
The second finding of this work was as regards the quality of some of the works 
already carried out. It was reported that the ‖quality of some of the deliveries were 
very inadequate and as such extra work was required to bring them up to the 
necessary standard‖.  
Snøhvit construction witnessed the inter-mixing and inter-dependency of hundreds of 
supply chains, therefore success in the project is subject to the extent of quality of 
work of every segment of the chain. Good logistic control as regards quality of 
anticipated engineering, vendor data, equipment and material deliveries, must be in 
place to ensure the project was within time and budget but that wasn‟t really the case 
in Snøhvit.  
A typical recorded example where there were quality defects was the case of quality 
flaws to modules from continental Europe resulting to transfer of work to Melkøya. 
Another example of quality flaw took place recently and was reported in Hydrocarbons 
technology journal (2007) was the sea-water leakage in a heat exchanger in the 
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cooling system of the Melkøya liquefaction plant. This consequently led to a closure of 
the plant on 7 November 2007 for the modification and redesigning of the onshore 
plant cooling system. The plant re-started production in mid-January only to closed 
again in March 2008 for the same cooling system difficulties and was finally reopened 
in July 2008. This prompted Statoil to announce that the project was unlikely to reach 
full capacity until 2009 because some parts of the plant were only operating at 60% 
capacity.  
 
9.3 DELAYS IN SUPPLY OF STRATEGIC MATERIALS. 
 
Construction of Snøhvit also witnessed some delays in supply of strategic materials all 
which gave rise to increase in costs. Between June and October 2004, Statoil 
reported a cost increase of €510 to 760 million and delay of 6 to 12 months and the 
reason for it being due to ―measures implemented to deal with failures by contractors 
and equipment suppliers‖. There were already so much delays being incurred that 
Statoil was quoted as saying that, ‖the original intention of having module testing 
performed at the fabrication yards proved impossible to adhere to without incurring 
further lengthy delays. Instead it was decided that outstanding work would be 
transferred to Melkøya, where the work-scope of Aker Kvaerner and its 
subcontractors was expanded to cover the additional requirements‖. 
 
The effects of these delays and flaws for Snøhvit were captured in Statoil annual 
report of 2004 when the reasons for the cost review were given. The report showed 
that the ―total development costs for the project are estimated to be NOK 51.3 billion 
for all phases, of which NOK 22.3 billion has been invested as of December 31, 
2004‖. Statoil increased the estimated development cost by NOK 6 billion in 2004 
after a detailed assessment of cost and progress. The updated estimate takes into 
consideration consequences of cost and schedule delays that occurred due to test 
 76 
failure of compressors, late delivery of drawings and materials and productivity 
below expectation.  
 
9.4 COMPETENCE AND RELIABILITY ON NEW TECHNOLOGY  
 
Perhaps this is the most contributors to cost overrun in Snøhvit. Even though the 
engineering and technology concept adopted for Snøhvit was built up by well 
understood elements, it still remains that the concept was a new and untested one 
and as a whole without any industrial references. The Mixed Fluid Cascade (MFC) 
process was touted as an onshore processing marvel using the latest up-to-date 
technology but this uniqueness unfortunately was a recipe for errors. The 
implementation of the new technology, (mixed fluid cascade, MFC), introduced major 
factors of uncertainty of which enough attention was to paid to in the budgeting period. 
It was the opinion of Statoil executives that the technology adopted for Snøhvit was 
not comprehensively researched as claimed by the technology provider (Linde) before 
the approval.  Statoil claimed that they were led to believe that they had absolute 
control of the technology thereby awarding them the contract. But it was during the 
projects construction proper that it became clear how incompetent the main contractor 
was as regards the execution of the task. It was also noted that the scope of the job 
was way too big for Linde (as a company) to handle. 
In the past, new technology was adopted and judged purely on engineering criteria, 
unlike today where a more systematic approach referred to as “Technology 
Qualification” is used. “Technology Qualification” uses the system of the technology 
within a systematic risk based qualification to compensate for the lack of operation 
experience. By this method, it shows that it can meet the specific reliability targets 
without actual implementation in the mass market. But evidence has shown that as 
construction continues to advance, clients and stake holders start experiencing the 
risk of paying up-front for an exciting concept that may or may not prove commercially 
ready years later.   
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This was the case with Snøhvit. The technology (MFC) regardless of how inventive it 
was has never been implemented before and as such, contained many facets that 
were wrongly executed. This problem also has ripple effects on other aspects of the 
project.  According to Engsbretsen et all, (2002), Snøhvit was ―the first offshore 
development ever where CO2 is separated onshore and re-injected‖. This concept 
eventually succeeded but not after billions of money was spent in righting the 
numerous mistakes and problems that arose as a result of adopting an untested 
technology. 
 
9.5 INADEQUATE PLAN OF EXECUTION IN A HARSH ENVIRONMENT 
 
Snøhvit was developed in an area of specific ambient winter conditions. Freezing 
temperatures of -5°C to -15°C and high winds blowing from the North, up to a velocity 
of 25m/s, and wind chill factor up to -45°C are normal occurrences. These particular 
ambient conditions naturally cannot be conducive for man and material both during 
the construction phase as well as during plant operation. 
The problems associated to this harsh environment led to the fabrication of the 
majority of the components for the process plant at other places and were only 
coupled together in Melkøya. It was also for this reason that they decided to install as 
much as possible of the process plant onto a steel barge before being taken to 
Melkøya. This helped to reduce the amount of construction effort and time on site.  
Nevertheless, there were many more other facilities vital for the success of the entire 
operation which can only be carried out in Melkøya and as such came under the 
influence of the harsh environment.  
There were recorded delays attributed to this effect and good analyses of the work 
schedule showed a lack of or complete negligence of the degree of disruption that can 
arise due to bad weather conditions.  
One such example is in the construction of the LNG storage tanks. Data obtained 
from Snøhvit construction schedule showed that they estimated it to take 28 months 
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between starting on site (with the LNG Tank raft) to the moment the LNG Tank is 
ready for commissioning. Details show work should start on April 1st 2003, and 
completed on August 1st 2004.  But this means having to work all year round even in 
winter time. The time schedule also shows that the roof will be prepared and lifted in 
May 2004. This period is always marked with high wind velocity and as such may 
prove too difficult to accomplish. 
The schedule also showed that site piping erection works starts ± 18 months after 
contract award, with detail engineering isometrics completed 24 months after contract 
award. But this involves starting the erection works in January 2004 (in full winter 
period) and completing the piping works during the winter period of 2005.  
 
Analysis of the weather conditions in Hammerfest shows that these calculations were 
not feasible. It is not really practicable to work during the extreme winter months of 
December to February. Rightfully, Statoil had many records of work stoppages as a 
result of bad weather. An example was when Statoil stopped work at the gas 
liquefaction plant on 19 January as a precautionary measure. Such stoppages all 
contributed to cost and time overrun and this should have been envisaged and 
accounted for during the design and briefing stages. The industry therefore should 
and must prepare for such unforeseen eventualities in such harsh environment. 
 
9.6 DISRUPTIONS BY INTEREST GROUPS 
 
Environmental and regulatory compliance costs were not given sufficient the expected 
consideration during Snøhvits contract negotiation period by both the client and 
engineering firms. 
According to Buch (2002), ”the Barents Sea is one of the world’s most precious and 
vulnerable sea areas, and furthermore one of the last natural areas in Europe which is 
not yet depleted by human intervention and pollution. ”He further noted that the sea 
areas just outside Melkøya in the Barents Sea are home to some of the richest with 
 79 
respect to seabirds. Besides this, the Barents Sea is the most important breeding area 
to a number of commercial fish species making the waters and area around Barents 
Sea an important ecological site‖. 
As a result, there were environmentalist groups that wanted to put a stop to oil and 
gas drilling activities in order to forestall damage to this pristine environment.  
One such group was the environmental foundation Bellona. They filed a complaint 
with the Brussels based ESA, the surveillance watchdog of European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) against Snøhvit project. They reasoned that there is “reason to 
believe that the chemical combinations and the oil being spilt during production will 
have negative effects on the biological life in the sea. As the Barents Sea is the most 
important breeding area to a number of commercial fish species, it is obvious that this 
type of pollution will stand in harsh conflict to the need for clean breeding area‖. 
 
Based on the law suit, the partners in the Statoil operated Snøhvit field in the Barents 
Sea resolved on 21st March to halt work on the project at Melkøya until the ESA had 
clarified the framework terms. Statoil stated in their news journal of 1/8/2002 that 
‖delays as a result of the EFTA Surveillance Authority’s investigation into the tax 
regulations for the Snøhvit project have led to extra costs of between NOK 500 million 
and 1 billion‖.  
 
The news journal further noted that ―the extra costs are a consequence of the almost 
four-month stoppage where no contracts were entered into and nor were any 
purchase orders issued during this period.‖  
The effect on Snøhvit as a result of ESA actions include extra costs of preparing the 
plant area at Melkøya, increased engineering costs, and future costs for making up 
the delays such as ensuring sales of about 5 billion cubic meters of gas per year to 
clients in the USA and Spain - a deal worth about NOK 5 billion was not affected. 
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9.7 GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE 
Snøhvit is owned by Statoil of which the Norwegian government controls two third 
majorities of shares. Statoil and its activities are subject to regulation by the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy, its Petroleum Directorate, and the Petroleum Safety Authority 
(PSA). The PSA considers the health and safety of workers, as well as the natural 
environment. The Ministry of the Environment also oversees petroleum activity 
through the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (SFT).  Therefore there is inherently 
a big logistical challenge of mixing and balancing the interests of both Statoil and the 
government. The annual report of Statoil (2005) highlighted this challenge when it 
stated that, ―if the Norwegian State were to take actions pursuant to its extensive 
powers over activities on the Norwegian Continental Shelf or to change 
laws/regulations, policies or practices relating to the oil and gas industry, our NCS 
exploration, development and production activities and results of operations could be 
materially and adversely affected‖.  
The situation described above now and then arises of which Statoil in their annual 
report of 2005 affirms this when it stated that, ―the interests of their majority owner, the 
Norwegian government are not always aligned to the interests of Statoil‖. The 
conflicting roles of the state – directly profiting from oil and gas production by 
promoting its expansion in an era of declining production, and simultaneously 
regulating the industry – raises questions about the ability of the state to accomplish 
both missions. Though agencies operate independently, conflicts and unbalanced 
outcomes are inevitable. Snøhvit witnessed some situations in which interests of both 
the government and Statoil differ which in turn led to cost increase: and some of them 
are stated below: 
a) WoodMac report noted that Norway employs a separate tax base for onshore and 
offshore facilities. The onshore rates, which cover standard industrial activities, 
include a 28% ″corporation tax" while offshore upstream oil and gas activities are 
subject to an additional "special tax" at a rate of 50%.  Norwegian authorities currently 
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favor taxing the entire project, including all LNG terminal facilities, at the higher 
offshore tax rates which obviously are not favorable to Statoil.   
b) The royal decree of December 19, 2001, where the Norwegian government 
decided that Norwegian oil production should be reduced by 150,000 barrels per day 
from January 1, 2002 until June 30, 2002. This amounted to roughly a 5 per cent 
reduction in output and for Statoil, owners of Snøhvit; it was a completely unfavorable 
situation which has a run-on effect on their other projects like Snøhvit. 
 
9.8 POOR GENERAL MANAGERIAL CONTROL 
 
It can be argued that almost every new upstream project has its fair share of risks 
which are simply inherent in complex industrial design but excellent project 
management should be able to capture (at least to a reasonable extent) the various 
risks associated with post-approval construction and operations.  In the past, cost in 
per volume terms had decreased consistently as economies of scale developed but 
these present times has seen costs increasing significantly. In the past three years, 
materials and project management costs has gone up 60% - 80% while construction 
labor has become 30% more expensive. Cost and delay risks go hand in hand with 
the rush to begin construction without detailed assessment of the challenges ahead. 
 
Snøhvit witnessed so many recorded lapses attributed to poor managerial control of 
which a typical example is the late mobilization and poor productivity at the main yard. 
The chief executive of Statoil Helge Lund admitted that, ―control of the project has 
been insufficient and we have not managed to correct the imbalances in the project 
quickly‖. The result of such lapse in a mage structure with billions in budget money 
can only be two things - delay and cost overruns.   
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The general summary of our finding was contained in this statement of Erling 
Øverland, the acting chief executive of Statoil when he said that, "Snøhvit is one of the 
most extensive and technically-complex projects we've ever launched, we have 
underestimated its complexity and we acknowledge that the project was not 
sufficiently matured when the decision to develop was taken in 2001."  
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CHAPTER 10. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
10.1 CONCLUSION 
 
As regards causes of cost overrun in mega projects, two major conclusions can be 
drawn from this research.  
 
a) Complete project information before the start of the work leads to more accurate 
capital cost budget estimates. But then, the most serious problem when a budget is 
being estimated is that little information is often available. Therefore, there is need to 
allocate and spend more time in the early briefing stages of the project design to 
clearly define a project's scope and complexity.  
 
b) Changes to original plan should be seen and regarded as the greatest risk in 
construction. Regardless of how much design information that is available for and 
during estimating, the gains accruing from them can be significantly depleted and 
negated by any design changes that are subsequently made. Changes in themselves 
should not be taken as threats only, they can be an avenue for cost savings and 
increase in value but that depends on how effective such changes were managed. 
10.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Due to the complex nature of LNG mega projects, they are always challenging and 
risky coupled with large number of interfaces and interdependencies. Therefore, 
scope changes at the design and planning stages have to be expected and efforts at 
monitoring and controlling put in place by project teams.  
This was captured by Jergeas and Ruwanpura (2010) when they stated that “clients 
and interest groups must adhere only to processes that detect and curb systematic 
cost underestimation, scope changes and schedule deviations as early as possible 
and take necessary and timely actions‖.  
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INTERVIEW QUESTIONS  
 
We are students of Molde University currently researching for our Msc thesis on the 
Logistics Challenges in Constructing Facilities in Mega-Projects with particular 
reference to COST AND TIME OVERRUN IN SNØHVIT LNG PLANT IN 
HAMMERFEST. 
The questions are directed to members of the Investment Committee appointed by the 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy in 1998 to investigate why investments on the 
Norwegian Continental shelf have increased compared to original budget and plans.  
The questions are structured to cover all stages of the project from design to 
construction but with special attention to the findings of the Investment committee of 
1998. Answers are given by ticking the box that suits the questions. In some cases, 
more than one answers can be given as seem fit.  
It must be stated here that answers given shall be treated in strict confidence and only 
used as part of our research into causes of cost and time overruns in oil and gas 
projects. 
Thanks. 
 
The objectives of this questionnaire are, 
-  To look into the main factors that can lead to cost overrun in mega projects 
like Snøhvit. This will be done by using the main reasons cited by the 
Investment Committee for the cost overrun in the boom to see whether those 
factors affected or were applicable to Snøhvit. 
- To look at other factors of cost overrun that was not considered in the boom 
and their effect on cost overrun in Snøhvit. 
QUESTIONS 
1) Was cost overrun in Snøhvit due to additional investment due to anticipated 
increase in income? 
a) Strongly Agree 
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b) Agree           
c) Disagree  
d) Strongly Disagree  
e) Don‟t know 
2)  Was the Plan for Development and Operation (PDO) approved for Snøhvit 
unrealistic as a result of exaggerated optimism based on positive trends during the 
preparation of decision making basis and decision making process? 
a) Strongly Agree 
b) Agree           
c) Disagree  
d) Strongly Disagree  
e) Don‟t know 
3)  Was the Plan for Development for Operation (PDO) approved for Snøhvit 
unrealistic as a result of unrealistic ambitions regarding substantial, further 
improvements and little comprehension of the uncertainty resulting from thin project 
maturing during the preparation of decision making basis and decision making 
process. 
a) Strongly Agree 
b) Agree           
c) Disagree  
d) Strongly Disagree  
e) Don‟t know 
4) In the planning process for Snøhvit offshore plant, Compact LNG (new technology 
for freezing techniques) was approved. This technique was challenging therefore they 
found good reason to organize this project different by contracting the whole 
engineering design to Linda and the fabrication and assembly to take place in Spain. 
Was this decision a factor in Snøhvit cost overrun? 
a) Strongly Agree 
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b) Agree           
c) Disagree  
d) Strongly Disagree  
e) Don‟t know 
5) Was the logistic of moving this whole package from Spain to Hammerfest in 
Norway a contributing factor to the cost overrun in Snøhvit? 
a) Strongly Agree 
b) Agree           
c) Disagree  
d) Strongly Disagree  
e) Don‟t know 
6)  How would you rate the cost estimation method adopted for Snøhvit? 
        (A) There was poor cost advice. 
        (B) There was inadequate contingency allowance. 
        (C) There was inadequate assessment of risks. 
        (D) Base method used for calculation doesn‟t suit the project. 
        (E) There was stubborn client attitude. 
        (F) It was good and up to standard. 
        (G) Any other suggestions? Please state. 
7) How important was brand new technology, complexity of the project and/or difficult 
to budget technology as factors in cost overrun in Snøhvit project. 
a) Very important 
b) Important          
c) Not relevant  
d) Highly irrelevant  
e) Don‟t know 
 8) Is the second boom in petroleum industries during which period Snøhvit was 
constructed, a main factor in Snøhvit cost overrun? 
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        YES              
        NO 
        Don‟t know 
 
9)  If yes, how important was these general activities in oil industry resulting in 
increase in cost (for example high cost of hiring plate-form) as factor in Snøhvit project 
cost overrun. 
a) Very important 
b) Important          
c) Not relevant  
d) Highly irrelevant  
e) Don‟t know 
10)  How important was lack of competence in one or more of the EPC contractors a 
factor in Snøhvit project cost overrun. 
a) Very important 
b) Important          
c) Not relevant  
d) Highly irrelevant  
e) Don‟t know 
11)  How significant was the new information coming up during the development that 
led to changes in the project affect cost overrun in Snøhvit project. 
a) Very significant 
b) Significant          
c) Not significant  
d) Highly irrelevant  
e) Don‟t know 
12)  Was lack of risk assessment and risk sharing pattern between the Operator and 
EPC contractors an important factor in the cost overrun in Snøvhit project? 
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a) Very important 
b) Important          
c) Not relevant  
d) Highly irrelevant  
e) Don‟t know 
13) The technology adopted for Snøhvit was completely new. Were the contractors 
always in good control of the technique from beginning to end? 
a) Strongly Agree 
b) Agree           
c) Disagree  
d) Strongly Disagree  
e) Don‟t know 
14)  How important was the first delay in the early stage of development by Linda to 
Snøvhit cost overrun?  
a) Very important 
b) Important          
c) Not relevant  
d) Highly irrelevant  
e) Don‟t know 
15)  How important was the contribution of Linda to the problem of the other 
contractors or suppliers? 
a) Very important 
b) Important          
c) Not relevant  
d) Highly irrelevant  
e) Don‟t know 
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16)  Was the boom in the oil industry between 2004 and 2008 during which period 
Snøvhit project was developed an important factor in the cost overrun? 
a) Very important 
b) Important          
c) Not relevant  
d) Highly irrelevant  
e) Don‟t know 
17)   Due to the complex nature of the project, was the time limit set for the plants 
completion realistic?       
        YES              
        NO 
        Don‟t know 
 
18)  If NO, do you thinks there was  
       a) Unrealistic design development periods. 
       b) Unavoidable delays by employer and client.  
       c) Unrealistic construction time frame. 
       d) Unrealistic materials supply time frame. 
       e) Don‟t know 
 
19)   Considering the fact that Snøhvit LNG plant is located in a remote virgin 
environment, (MELKØYA ISLAND), do you think adequate studies and arrangements 
were put in place for unforeseen site conditions, constraints and restrictions? 
        YES                
         NO 
         Don‟t know 
20)  If NO, was there recorded interruption(s) attributed to nature? 
        YES                   
        NO 
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        Don‟t know 
21)   It was of the opinion that the location of the plant in remote northern Norway was 
an effort from the government to boost migration and employment in the area. Do you 
think the cost estimates were deliberately lowered to get approval from parliament? 
     YES                 
     NO 
     Don‟t know 
22)   It was of the opinion that the location of the plant in remote northern Norway was 
an effort from the government to boost migration and employment in the area. Do you 
think the contractors have used this against the clients by deliberately adopting less 
cost efficient methods in order to increase their gains? 
    YES                       
    NO 
    Don‟t know 
 
23)   The projects construction and materials procurement routes  consists of 
hundreds of intermixed supply chains– clients, contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, 
sub-suppliers, service providers, third and forth party logistics providers etc. Do you 
think adequate investigation as regards competence was carried out before awarding 
of contracts?      
    YES                       
    NO 
    Don‟t know 
24)   If NO, were there recorded delay(s), lack of or late supply of materials from any 
of the above?       
   YES                       
    NO 
    Don‟t know 
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25)   Did the project owners and contractors maintain a cordial relationship with the 
people of Hammerfest or other interest groups throughout the construction time? 
      YES                       
      NO 
      Don‟t know 
26)   If NO, was there any time delays directly or indirectly connected to attitudes of 
the interest groups. 
       YES                       
        NO 
        Don‟t know 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
